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QUESTION PRESENTED 
In this case petitioner Price Waterhouse was held to 
have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
because of its failure to make respondent Hopkins a part-
ner in the firm. Although Price Waterhouse was held to 
have established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-
pretextual reason for that decision, the court of appeals 
characterized the case as one involving "mixed motives" 
for the employment decision because the firm's decision-
making process included some unconscious and unquan-
tifiable measure of impermissible "sex stereotyping." 
The court of appeals held, 2-1, in conflict with the deci-
sions of this Court and of other courts of appeals, that 
in a "mixed motive" case the plaintiff prevails unless the 
defendant shows-and shows by clear and convincing evi-
dence-that impermissible bias was not a decisive cause 
of the employment decision. 
The question presented is whether the court of appeals 
was in error in shifting the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of intentional discrimination to the defendant, and 
in defining that burden in accordance with the "clear and 
convincing" standard, even though the district court 
found that there existed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, 
and nonpretextual reason for the employment decision, 
and even though there was no showing that discrimina-
tory bias played any causal role in that decision. 
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OCTOBER TERM, 1987 
No. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PETITIONER 
v. 
ANN B. HOPKINS, RESPONDENT 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI T'O THE 
UNITED STATES, COURT OF APPEALS, 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
Price Waterhouse respectfully petitions for a writ of 
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra, 
la-39a) is reported at 825 F.2d 458. The opinion of the 
district court ( Gesell, D .J.) ( App. B, infra, 40a-62a) is 
reported at 618 F. Supp. 1109. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals (App. C, infra, 
63a) was entered on August 4, 1987, and a petition for 
rehearing was denied on September 30, 1987 (App. D, 
infra, 65a). 011- December 11, 1987, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist extended the time for filing this petition to January 
12, 1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 
28 u.s.c. § 1254 ( 1). 
2 
STATEMENT 
1. Introduction. The question presented by this peti-
tion involves the proper allocation of burdens of proof in 
Title VII cases, and is one on which the courts of ap-
peals are in sharp conflict. Here a divided panel of the 
court of appeals (Edwards, J., and Joyce Hens Green, 
D.J., with Williams, J., dissenting) held that Price 
Waterhouse violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, when it declined to make re-
spondent, Ann B. Hopkins, a partner in the firm. The 
court of appeals did not disturb the district court's fac-
tual finding that Price Waterhouse had established a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual basis 
for its decision not to make Hopkins a partner, but it 
held that that showing was insufficient to negate liability 
under Title VII because the process by which Hopkins 
was considered for partnership may have included some 
unquantifiable measure of impermissible "sex stereotyp-
ing." Even though Hopkins presented no evidence of any 
illicit motivation on the part of any of the persons ac-
tually responsible for making the partnership decision 
at Price Waterhouse, the court of appeals characterized 
the case as one involving "mixed motives" on the basis 
of the testimony of an "expert * * * in the field of [sex] 
stereotyping" ( App. 53a) who purported to see "sex 
stereotyping" in some of the casual language used about 
Hopkins by a few individuals (none of them final deci-
sionmakers in her case, and all but one of them support-
ers of her partnership bid). It then held that in such 
"mixed motive" cases (a) the defendant employer bears 
the burden of proving that unlawful bias was not the 
determinative factor in the challenged employment deci-
sion; and (b) that burden must be carried by "clear 
and convincing" evidence. 
The first question before this Court is whether-and in 
what circumstances-the plaintiff in a Title VII action 
may be relieved of the ultimate burden of proving that 
8 
intentional discrimination was a but-for cause of the 
adverse employment action. Second, even if such a dra-
matic departure from this Court's Title VII precedents 
and the conventional rules of the legal system is appro-
priate in limited circumstances, the further question is 
whether the employer in such a case must negative un-
lawful bias by the extraordinary standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. There is a direct and highly con-
fusing series of conflicts among the courts of appeals on 
both of these questions. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
( 1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248 ( 1981), this Court allocated the bur-
dens of proof and persuasion in Title VII disparate 
treatment cases. Emphasizing that "[t]he ultimate bur-
den of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains 
at all times with the plaintiff," the Court established a 
"division of intermediate evidentiary burdens" designed 
to resolve the "ultimate question" of intentional dis-
crimination that a plaintiff must prove. Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 253. First, the plaintiff must establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. The defendant is then permitted to meet that 
preliminary showing by "'articulat[ing] some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant comes forward with 
such evidence, the plaintiff may attempt "to demonstrate 
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the 
employment decision." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A 
plaintiff who makes such a showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence will have successfully carried her burden 
of proving that she was "the victim of intentional dis-
crimination." Ibid. 
In Burdine, however, the Court specifically "discussed 
only the situation in which the issue is whether either 
4 
illegal or legal motives, but not
 both, were the 'true' 
motives behind the decision." 
NLRB v. Transportation 
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
, 400 n.5 (1983) (em-
phasis added). Thus the Cou
rt has not yet expressly 
discussed the burdens of proof
 and persuasion in Title 
VII cases involving so-called "mix
ed-motive" situations-
where, although there was a l
egitimate reason for the 
challenged employment action, 
it is alleged that there 
may also have existed an illegi
timate motivation, and it 
is argued that Title VII was v
iolated by the forbidden 
motive's presence. 
In the absence of explicit guida
nce from this Court on 
that critical issue, the courts 
of appeals have adopted 
widely divergent analyses, alloca
ting the burdens and set-
ting the standards of proof in 
so-called "mixed-motive" 
Title VII cases in no fewer t
han five different ways. 
Some circuits require the plain
tiff to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence tha
t the decisive "but-for" 
reason for the adverse employ
ment decision was inten-
tional discrimination. Other c
ircuits require the same 
"but-for" showing, but they req
uire it to be made by the 
def end ant rather than the plaint
iff. The court of appeals 
in this case aligned itself with
 the courts that put the 
burden on the def end ant, but c
reated yet another cate-
gory by holding that that burd
en could be satisfied only 
by the extraordinary standard 
of clear and convincing 
evidence, rather than a prepon
derance of the evidence. 
Finally, some circuits draw a di
stinction between the lia-
bility and remedy phases of a
 case, holding that Title 
VII liability will be found wh
enever an impermissible 
motive was present to any ex
tent, but permitting the 
defendant to avoid the imposi
tion of affirmative relief 
(such as reinstatement or prom
otion) by showing that 
unlawful bias was not a but-fo
r cause of the challenged 
decision. Here again, there is a
 split within the circuits 
on whether a defendant's burden
 of proof on the question 
of remedy must be carried by 
clear and convincing evi-
5 
dence or may he satisfied by a preponderance of the evi-
dence instead. 
We discuss below the conflict among the circuits and 
the need for a definitive resolution by this Court (see 
pages 13-17, infra). First, however, we briefly describe 
the findings and conclusions of the courts below. 
2. The District Court's Findings. Hopkins initiated 
this action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, claiming that unlawful sex discrimina-
tion was the cause of Price Waterhouse's decision not to 
advance her to partnership in 1982.1 In response, Price 
Waterhouse showed that during her five-year period of 
employment with the firm her abrasive personality and 
deficient interpersonal skills created grave problems, mak-
ing it particularly difficult for employees subject to her 
supervision to work harmoniously with her. One staff 
member ( who testified on Hopkins' behalf) indicated that 
"it required 'diplomacy, patience and guts' to work with 
her." App. 46a ( quoting 3/27 /85 Tr. 434). The district 
court accepted this showing, agreeing with Price Water-
house that Hopkins "had considerable problems dealing 
with staff and peers." App. 59a. Indeed, after carefully 
examining Hopkins' employment history at Price Water-
house, the district court found that both "[s] upporters 
and opponents of her candidacy indicated that [Hopkins] 
was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult 
1 Initially, Price Waterhouse decided only to place Hopkins' 
partnership candidacy on "hold" for at least a year, " 'to afford 
[Hopkins] time to demonstrate that she has the personal and 
leadership qualities required of a partner.'" App. 44a (citation 
omitted). Several months after that decision, however, two Price 
Waterhouse partners who had been key advocates of Hopkins' 
partnership bid decided instead to oppose it, and Hopkins' ad-
vocates concluded that reconsideration in the next year's partner-
ship selection cycle would therefore be in vain. The district court 
found that the decision not to reconsider was not discriminatory 
(id. at 48a), and Hopkins did not appeal that determination. 
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to work with and impatient with staff." Id. a
t 43a-44a. 
The district court concluded that the compla
ints about 
Hopkins' "interpersonal skills were not fabric
ated as a 
pretext for discrimination" and that Hopkins
' "conduct 
provided ample justification for the complaints t
hat formed 
the basis of the [firm's] decision" that her p
artnership 
candidacy should be postponed for at least one
 year. Id. 
at 46a-47a. 
The district court also rejected Hopkins' attemp
t, based 
on a comparison of her file with those of sim
ilarly situ-
ated men, to show that Price Waterhouse treat
ed her dif-
ferently from male candidates with abrasive 
or aggres-
sive personalities. At the same time, however, 
the district 
court believed that some of the negative charac
terizations 
about Hopkins' foul language, arrogance, 
and impa-
tience-e.g., that she needed to take a "course
 in charm 
school"-reflected "unconscious" (App. 54.a) 
but "dis-
criminatory [sex] stereotyp [ing] ." Id. at 57a
. Still, the 
district court balanced this evidence against th
e record of 
acknowledged "deficiencies" in Hopkins' perfor
mance ( id. 
at 46a)-deficiencies acknowledged not only b
y the dis-
trict court but, at least in some cases, by Ho
pkins her-
self. Ibid. At the end of the day, the district c
ourt found, 
Hopkins had proved only that sex stereotypi
ng "played 
an undefined role in blocking [her] admission t
o the part-
nership." Id. at 54a (emphasis added). Beca
use of this 
weak showing, the district court found, 
the Court cannot say that [Hopkins] would
 have 
been elected to partnership if the Policy Board'
s deci-
sion had not been tainted by sexually biased e
valua-
tions. 
Id. at 59a. 
The district court thus found that Hopkins 
had not 
shown that discrimination by Price Waterho
use caused 
the harm she was suing to redress: the eviden
ce did not 
establish that she would have made partner e
ven in the 
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absence of any sexual stereotyping or that such conduct 
was actually a motivating factor in Price Waterhouse's 
decision. ( Indeed, the district court did not find even 
"unconscious" stereotyping on the part of any person at 
Price Waterhouse responsible for actually making the 
relevant decision about Hopkins.) Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court found that Title VII was violated. The viola-
tion was deemed to arise from the confluence of three 
factors, none of which the court thought was discrimina-
tory standing alone. First, "[c]omments influenced"-
albeit "unconsciously"-"by sex stereotypes were made 
by partners." Second, 
the firm's evaluation process gave substantial weight 
to these comments; and [third], the partnership 
failed to address the conspicuous problem of stereo-
typing in partnership evaluations. While these three 
factors might have been innocent alone, they com-
bined to produce discrimination in the case of this 
plaintiff. 
App. 58a. Price Waterhouse was found liable because, 
"[d] espite the fact that the comments on women candi-
dates often suggested that the male evaluators may have 
been influenced by sex bias, the Policy Board never ad-
dressed the problem." Id. at 55a. 
The defendant's liability was thus not predicated upon 
an employment decision shown to have been made on the 
basis of gender; the district court did not find that dis-
crimination caused Hopkins' rejection. Price Waterhouse 
was found to have committed an intentional violation of 
Title VII solely by failing to counteract the unconscious 
sexism that the court read into the colloquialisms of some 
of her colleagues-none of them the ultimate decision-
makers-commenting on her performance in the course 
of the evaluation process. 
The district court's imposition of liability notwithstand-
ing its failure to find that Hopkins' rejection was caused 
by discrimination is particularly troubling because of the 
way in which the existence of even "unconscious" sex 
II 
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steretoyping was divined. The district court's insight 
into these unconscious elements of Price Waterhouse's 
partnership decisionmaking process came primarily from 
the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, "a well qualified expert" 
in the "field of stereotyping." App. 53a. Although 
Dr. Fiske had never met Hopkins, and made no inquiry 
whatever into the facts of Hopkins' actual performance 
at Price Waterhouse, her review of the written comments 
made by Price Waterhouse partners about Hopkins' per-
formance enabled her to opine that the partners' negative; 
statements about Hopkins' rudeness, arrogance, and 
abrasiveness were caused by sexual stereotypes rather 
than the reality that they accurately described. Dr. Fiske 
reached this conclusion by simply excluding from her con-
sideration the actual evidence of Hopkins' behavior, evi-
dence that persuaded even the district court that Hopkins' 
"conduct provided ample justification for the complaints" 
about her. Id. at 46a-47a. Here is a typical exchange: 
Q. * * * Some of these folks describe Miss Hop-
kins, as you have read back to me, as overbearing, 
arrogant, self-centered, abrasive, thinks she knows 
more than anyone in the universe, and potentially 
dangerous. Would you think it would be somehow a 
stereotypical decision to exclude such a person from 
the partnership if that was in fact true? 
A. I am not qualified to say whether or not it is 
true * * * [b] ecause I didn't observe her behavior. 
3/ 28/ 85 Tr. 596-597. 
As Judge Williams, dissenting below, observed, this 
means that "if an observer characterized someone as 
'overbearing and arrogant and abrasive and running over 
people,' an expert such as Dr. Fiske could discern * * * 
that [those comments] stemmed from unconscious stereo-
types * * * without meeting the subject of the comment 
or making any inquiry into a possible factual basis." 
App. 36a. Further, Dr. Fiske found forbidden motives 
even in the comments of partners who supported Hopkins' 
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partnership bid because their favorable comments were 
efforts "to overcome their stereotypical attitudes." Id. at 
13a n.3 (citing 3/28/85 Tr. 565). It seems clear, there-
fore, that on this approach "no woman could be overbear-
ing, arrogant or abrasive: any observations to that effect 
would necessarily be discounted as the product of stereo-
typing. If analysis like this is to prevail in federal 
courts, no employer can base any adverse action as to a 
woman on such attributes." App. 36a (Williams, J., 
dissenting) .2 
3. The Court Of Appeals' Decision. A divided panel of 
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding 
of liability as well as the theory upon which it was based. 
Most important for present purposes, the court expressly 
recognized that the causation issue was at the center of 
the case. Noting the split among the circuits as to where 
the burden of proof should be placed (App. 21a n.8), the 
court of appeals rejected Price Waterhouse's appeal only 
"[b] ecause Price Waterhouse could not demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that impermissible bias 
was not the determinative factor" ( id. at 25a). Price 
Waterhouse was held to have violated Title VII solely on 
the basis of the amorphous proposition that "stereotypical 
attitudes towards women had manifested themselves in 
connection with the partnership bids of other women and 
* * * that these stereotypes had been brought to bear on 
2 Dr. Fiske's testimony was disturbing in yet another respect. 
Over Price Waterhouse's objection (3/28/85 Tr. 539), Hopkins was 
permitted to use Dr. Fiske as a "rebuttal" witness in a supposed 
effort to negate Price Waterhouse's showing that it had a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to make Hopkins a 
partner. At this stage of the case, however, Hopkins should have 
been permitted only to attempt to prove that the reason articulated 
by Price Waterhouse was a pretext for discrimination. See Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 256. In fact, Hopkins never attempted to prove 
pretext, and, as previously noted, the district court expressly found 
that the complaints about Hopkins' "interpersonal skills were not 




[Hopkins'] candidacy" (id. at 20a)-even though Hop-
kins had not proved that she would have been made a 
partner in the absence of stereotyping. Indeed, the court 
of appeals expressly refused to require Hopkins to make 
any such showing. Assigning to Title VII plaintiffs the 
burden of proof on every aspect of their cases, including 
causation, the court held, would "place an enormous, per-
haps insurmountable, burden on Title VII litigants" 
(ibid;). Instead, the court of · appeals shifted the burden 
to Price Waterhouse to negate by clear and convincing 
evidence a fact that the court acknowledged was "impos-
sible to measure." App. 9a.3 
In dissent, Judge Williams agreed that the central issue 
on appeal was causation, but observed that "the record 
here provided no causal connection between Hopkins' fate 
and such stereotyping as went on among Price Water-
house's 662 partners." App. 29a.4 Judge Williams also 
3 After being informed that she would not be reproposed for 
partnership (see note 1, supra), Hopkins resigned from the firm. 
The district court held that Hopkins failed to prove that the deci-
sion not to repropose was a "constructive discharge," and it there-
fore ruled that Hopkins was not entitled to an order directing Price 
Waterhouse to make her a partner. App. 60a-6la. The court of 
appeals reversed this aspect of the district court's decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings on the remedial phase 
of the case. Id. at 27a-28a. 
4 As Judge Williams noted, "[t]he only remark by a Hopkins 
opponent that can be characterized as manifesting sexual stereotyp-
ing is the facetious . suggestion that she should take a 'course at 
charm school.' The smoke from this gun seems to me rather wispy. 
It was embedded in the following comment : 
Contacts with Ann are only casual-several mtgs at OGS and 
MMGS sessions. However, she is consistently annoying and ir-
ritating-believes she knows more than anyone about anything, 
is not afraid to let the world know it. Suggest a course at 
charm school before she is considered for admission. I would 
be embarrassed to introduce her as a ptnr." 
App. 33a (emphasis added). The majority was able to find evidence 
of sex stereotyping in the "charm school" remark only by resorting 
ll 
was troubled by Dr. Fiske's impressive claim that she 
was "able to find forbidden stereotyping simply by reading 
partners' comments-without information about the truth 
of the matters commented upon." Id at 36a. Finally, 
Judge Williams objected to the majority's willingness to 
find that the mere presence of stereotypes would result in 
Title VII liability unless the employer undertook "to 
institute special programs for sensitizing partners to sex 
stereotyping or otherwise to stamp it out of the evaluation 
process." Id. at 37a. Judge Williams suggested that, 
Ibid. 
[i]f such an omission is to ground liability, perhaps 
the plaintiff should bear an initial burden of demon-
strating that gender stereotyping was more probably 
than not the cause of the adverse employment deci-
sion. * * * 
From the facts here, it looks as though the duty 
to sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are 
serious. The more delicate the trigger, the more 
completely this court has dropped the requirement of 
intentional discrimination out of the law. * * * The 
rule turns Title VII from a prohibition of discrimi-
natory conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist 
thoughts. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
In conflict with decisions of this Court and of other 
courts of appeals, the court of appeals in this case incor-
rectly decided questions of great importance to the ad-
ministration of the civil rights laws. This Court has held 
to Webster's definition, not of that term, but of the term "finishing 
school." See App. 13a n.4. But Webster's defines "charm school" 
in sex-neutral terms, stating simply that it is "a school in which 
social graces are taught." Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary 378 (1986). The majority did not explain why it would be 
discriminatory for Price Waterhouse to insist that all of its part-
ners, male and female, be schooled in the social graces. 
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that the burden of persuasion in Title VII cases remains 
at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
256. The court of appeals' decision contravenes that prin-
ciple in at least three ways. First, the court's decision 
requires the defendant to prove that discrimination did 
not cause the adverse employment decision, rather than 
r equiring the plaintiff to prove that it did. Second, even 
if it were appropriate to relieve the plaintiff of the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion on the question of causation 
in specific, narrow circumstances, the court of appeals 
erred gravely by requiring the defendant to make its 
showing by clear and convincing evidence. Third, the 
court of appeals improperly evaded the holding of Burdine 
by characterizing this case as one of "mixed motives" on 
the basis of impalpable evidence of supposed sexism-
discernible only through an "expert" judgment that in 
fact ignored most of the actual evidence in the case--
that was not shown to have had a causal impact on the 
disputed employment decision. The net effect of the court 
of appeals' decision is to place a virtually insurmountable 
burden on an employer, even where there exists over-
whelming evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, 
and nonpretextual basis for its refusal to promote a Title 
VII plaintiff. 
The circuits are in total disarray on the appropriate 
allocation of the burdens and standards of proof in 
so-called "mixed-motive" cases, adopting no fewer than 
five different approaches to this issue. Review by this 
Court is needed to abate this confusion. And review is 
particularly appropriate in this case because, among the 
possible approaches to this problem, the court below chose 
one that clearly violates this Court's precedents and can-
not be squared with the policies of Title VII. Accordingly, 
review by this Court is warranted. 
13 
A. The Conflict Among The Circuits Requires Resolution 
By This Court. 
As the court of appeals recognized (App. 20a-21a & 
n.8), the circuits are in conflict on the question whether 
a Title VII plaintiff must prove that impermissible dis-
crimination was a "but-for" cause of a challenged employ-
ment decision.0 Lacking a uniform rule, the courts of 
appeals have devised no fewer than five inconsistent ways 
to resolve cases in which it is argued that the defendant 
acted on the basis of both a lawful and an unlawful 
motive. 
The first approach is based on this Court's statement 
in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 
282 n.10 ( 1976), that, for a Title VII plaintiff to pre-
vail, "no more is required to be shown than that race 
was a 'but for' cause" of the challenged employment deci-
sion. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
draw their rule in mixed-motive cases from this observa-
tion, holding that "a [Title VII] plaintiff must show that 
his status as a minority class was the but for reason 
for the treatment accorded." Bellissimo v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing 
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 916 (3d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984), and noting 
the "considerable confusion" regarding the proper stand-
ard of proof in Title VII cases). Accord Ross v. Com-
munications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-366 ( 4th 
Cir. 1985) (" [f] or the employee to disprove a legitimate 
5 Although the court of appeals recognized the existence of a con-
flict, it did not fully describe the extent of that conflict, nor did it 
evidence any awareness that the conflict embraces two separate 
questions: first, whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the 
burden of proving causation in a "mixed-motive" case and, second, 
whether the standard of proof by which that burden must be met 
is a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. 
Compare pages 13-16, infra, with App. 21a n.8. 
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nondiscriminatory explanation for adverse action, the 
third stage of the Burdine analysis, we determine that he 
must show that the adverse action would not have occurred 
'but for' the protected conduct';); 6 Jack v. Texaco 
Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) 
( "the employee will prevail only by proving that 'but for' 
the protected activity she would not have been subjected 
to the action of which she claims"); McQuillen v. Wis-
consin Education Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th 
Cir. 1987) ("the employee must establish that the dis-
criminatory motivation was a determining factor in the 
challenged employment decision in that the employee 
would have received the job absent the discriminatory 
motivation"). 
The second approach, adopted by the First, Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits, turns on the same "but-for" inquiry 
but reverses the burden of proof. These courts require 
the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that, even without the forbidden motive, it would have 
made the same employment decision. Fields v. Clark 
University, 817 F.2d 931, 936 ( 1st Cir. 1987) ( once 
plaintiff proves "that unlawful discrimination was a 
motivating factor in the employment decision * * * the 
defendant must prove that the same decision would have 
6 In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit appeared to adopt the 
rule followed in the Ninth Circuit (see page 16, infra), holding 
that, " [ o] nee a plaintiff establishes that she was discriminated 
against, the defendant bears the burden of showing [by clear and 
convincing evidence] that the plaintiff would not have been pro-
moted even in the absence of discrimination." Patterson v. Green-
wood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982). Although 
the Fourth Circuit has never overruled Patterson, it has cited that 
decision only twice since it decided Ross--once in a dissenting 
opinion and once in dictum. See Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg 
& Potomac R.R., 803 F.2d 1322, 1332 (1986) (Haynsworth, J., dis-
renting) ; Soble v. University of Maryland, 778 F.2d 164, 166 n.4 
(1985) (dictum). Ross, therefore, apparently represents prevailing 
Fourth Circuit law. The situation in the Fourth Circuit confirms 
the extent of confusion and disarray among the courts of appeals. 
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been made absent the discrimination") ; Terbovitz v. 
Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th 
Cir. 1987) (quoting Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 
F .2d 703, 712 ( 6th Cir. 1985) ) (if plaintiff shows the 
presence of an illegal motive, "the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 'that 
the adverse employment action would have been taken 
even in the absence of the impermissible motivation' ") ; 
Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1284 (1984) 
(quoting Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 
769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that 
"[o] nee an [illegal] motive is proved to have been a 
significant or substantial factor in an employment deci-
sion, defendant can rebut only by proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the same decision would have 
been reached even absent the presence of that factor" 
(emphasis added by the Birmingham Linen court)). 
The District of Columbia Circuit likewise requires the 
defendant in a mixed-motive case to prove that it would 
have made the same employment decision even absent the 
proscribed motivation. App. 23a-25a. But that court goes 
further, requiring that the showing be made not by a 
preponde,rance of the evidence but by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Id. at 25a. 
Finally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits draw a distinc-
tion between the liability and remedy phases of a Title 
VII case. The Eighth Circuit holds that Title VII lia-
bility is established whenever an illegal motive is present 
in an adverse employment decision, even if the same 
decision would have been made in the absence of the for-
bidden motive. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 
1985) (en bane). The finding of liability will entitle the 
plaintiff to at least some relief, such as "a declaratory 
judgment, partial attorney's fees, and injunctive relief" 
(id. at 1324). But a defendant in the Eighth Circuit can 












and back pay by showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have taken the same employment 
action in any event. Id. at 1324 & n.5. 
The Ninth Circuit employs an essentially similar 
analysis, but it permits the defendant to avoid the imposi-
tion of affirmative relief only if it can prove by clear and 
convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that it would have made the same decision 
even in the absence of the prohibited motivation. Fadhl 
v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1165-
1166 (9th Cir. 1984); Muntin v. California Parks & 
Recreation Dep't, 738 F.2d 1054, 1055-1056 (9th Cir. 
1984) ; see also Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State 
Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). 
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, the lower 
courts are in need of guidance on the proper standards 
and allocation of burdens of proof for mixed-motive Title 
VII claims, being divided in several different ways. Some 
assign the but-for burden to the plaintiff; some to the 
defendant. Some hold that the but-for inquiry is irrele-
vant in the liability context, but dispositive at the remedy 
stage. Finally, even those circuits that agree that the 
defendant must make the but-for showing at some phase 
of the litigation cannot agree on the standard of proof: 
some hold that the defendant must make its showing by 
clear and convincing evidence, while others require only 
a preponderance.'1 
The district court's factual findings in this case-that 
atmospheric sexism could be detected in some of the writ-
ten evaluations of Hopkins' performance, but that Hop-
7 The Solicitor General recently noted the existence of this latter 
conflict in his Brief in Opposition (at 8 n.4) in Haskins v. United 
States Dep't of the Army, cert. denied, No. 86-1626 (Oct. 5, 1987). 
As the government there explained, Haskins was an inappropriate 
case in which to resolve the conflict because the plaintiff in that case 
received the benefit of the clear and convincing standard and yet 






'\11M....;.. ____________ ....itl ___
____ _ 
17 
kins did not show that she would have been asked to be 
a partner even absent that factor-clearly present the 
issu,es that must be resolved. The instant case is therefore 
well suited to enable this Court to provide the necessary 
guidance.8 
B. This Court's Precedents Dictate That A Title VII 
Plaintiff May Prevail Only By Showing That Dis-
crimination Was A But-For Cause Of The Challenged 
Employment Decision. 
Burdine's statement that the plaintiff retains the "ul-
timate burden of persuading the court that she has been 
the victim of intentional discrimination," 450 U.S. at 
256, precludes a Title VII defendant from being saddled 
with the burden of persuasion on the question of causa-
tion. As Burdine itself explained, the intermediate bur-
den placed on a defendant is merely one of production: 
the defendant must come forward with evidence that it 
had a legitimate reason for the challenged employment 
decision, but the defendant need not prove anything. 
Thus, the Court stated, 
[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it 
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It 
is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated 
against the plaintiff. * * * If the defendant carries 
this burden of production, the presumption raised by 
the prima f acie case is rebutted * * *. 
Id. at 254-255 (citation and footnotes omitted). 
The ultimate issue in a case like this one is the same 
as the ultimate issue in a case like Burdine: did discrim-
ination cause the plaintiff's injury? Burdine teaches 
8 A ruling in this case from this Court would be important not 
only for private employers, but also for the federal government, 
in light of the large number of Title VII cases brought in the Dis-
trict of Columbia against the federal government in its capacity as 





that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving an affirma.: 
tive answer to that question. Of course, a forbidden mo-
tive cannot have caused an injury if the employment de-
cision would have been the same in any event. If the law 
requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination caused 
her injury, the same law must necessarily require the 
plaintiff to show that without discrimination the injury 
would not have occurred. 
This rule-that the party with the burden of persua-
sion must at a minimum show but-for causation-is the 
conventional tort rule. Indeed, 
the "but-for" or "sine qua non" rule * * * [is] [a]t 
most * * * a rule of exclusion: if the event would 
not have occurred "but for" the defendant's negli-
gence, it still does not follow that there is liability. 
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 238-239 (4th ed. 1971) .9 
The same rule should be applied here. 
Burdine instructs that the burden of proof is allo-
cated in discrimination cases in the same way it is allo-
cated in other kinds of civil litigation. This Court has 
on other occasions relied on analogies to tort or other 
civil law in deducing the rules to govern cases brought 
under Title VII. See, e.g., United States Postal Servic'e 
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (cautioning that the 
differences between Title VII litigation and other cases 
does not mean "that trial courts or reviewing courts 
should treat discrimination differently from other ulti-
mate questions of fact") ; see also Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clearing erroneous 
standard of review applies with the same force in Title 
VII litigation as in other civil cases). 
9 An exception is the, case in which either of two actions is 
independently sufficient to cause an injury. See Prosser, supra, at 
240; H.L.A. Hart & A. Honore, Causation in the Law 107 (1973). 
That exception is irrelevant here. 
'-.r-,-____________________ ... 
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Removing the causation burden from the plaintiff has 
highly undesirable consequences. The antidiscrimination 
laws address intentions as well as conduct, and some 
efforts will therefore be necessary under any rule to as-
certain the defendant's motivation. But an affirmative 
finding that the defendant violated the law ( and should 
therefore be subject to governmentally imposed sanc-
tions) by discriminating in an employment decision, 
even where there existed a wholly legitimate and non-
pretextual basis for that decision, should be based on 
fair and substantial evidence that intentional discrimina-
tion played a decisive role; it should not be based on 
pretextual basis for that decision, should be based on 
fragmentary evidence of possible sexist factors that are 
artificially leveraged into a finding of "intention discrim-
ination" by a shift in the burden of persuasion. Title 
VII was not designed to prevent employers from basing 
employment decisions on legitimate, job-related, nondis-
criminatory factors; if one of these exists and is shown 
to be nonpretextual, the employment decision should not 
be overturned without a fair affirmative basis for believ-
ing that that decision would not have been made without 
the presence of a prohibited motive. 
Further, without a fair affirmative showing of causa-
tion, liability will have been imposed solely because of 
perceived "discrimination in the air"-because of vague 
notions of "societal discrimination" that have not been 
shown to have harmed the plaintiff directly. This Court 
has repeatedly refused to adopt such a standard. Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848 (1986) 
(opinion of Powell, J.); Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-308 (1978) (opin-
ion of Powell, J.). See also Fields v. Clark University, 
817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (proof that "the [chal-
lenged] decision was infected with discrimination" does 
not necessarily entitle plaintiff to relief). Indeed, the 
express language of Title VII itself precludes a finding of 
liability in the absence of proof of causation. The statute 
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provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's * * * sex" ( 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (emphasis added)). Further, Title VII 
expressly prohibits courts from requiring "the hiring, 
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such 
individual was refused * * * emp.ZOyment or advance-
ment * * * for any reason other than discrimination on 
account of * * * sex" ( 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5 ( g) ( emphasis 
added) ) . As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the lan-
guage of "Title VII contains a clear causal requirement 
between discriminatory motivation and the challenged 
employment decision." McQuillen, 830 F.2d at 664. The 
court of appeals' decision in this case, relieving plaintiff 
of the burden of proving causation, cannot be reconciled 
with these e·xpress statutory limitations on the reach of 
Title VIL1° 
1"l We recognize that in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), the Court held that once a plaintiff has 
shown that constitutionally protected conduct was a "substantial" 
or "motivating" factor in an adverse employment decision, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that it would have made the same employment decision even 
in the absence of the protected conduct. Similarly, in NLRB v. 
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the Court 
accepted the NLRB's position that once the General Counsel of the 
Board has proved that conduct protected by the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., was a "substantial" or 
"motivating" factor in the discharge of an employee, the burden 
shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
"that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for valid 
reasons" ( 462 U.S. at 400). These cases, however, did not address 
the specific language of Title VII, and thus they do not govern the 
question presented here. And even if Mt. Healthy and Transporta-
tion Management were thought to support shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant in a Title VII case, the most that could be 
required of the employer under those cases is proof by a preponder-
. ance of the evidence that the employment decision would have been 
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C. Even If A Defendant Must Show That The Same De-cision Would Have Been Made Without The Forbidden Motive, The Court Of Appeals Erred By Requiring That That Showing Be Made By Clear And Convincing Evidence. 
The Court has made it clear that the interests at issue in a Title VII case, while important, do not justify de-parture from the settled rules governing " 'the basic al-location of burdens and order of presentation of proof.'" Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252). The Aikens Court stated: 
All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. There will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination dif-ferently from other ultimate questions of fact. 
460 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added). See also id. at 718 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("the ultimate determina-tion of factual liability in discrimination cases should be no different from that in other types of civil suits"). 
This Court has consistently affirmed that the prepon-derance of the evidence standard is the burden generally imposed in civil litigation. See Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S.Ct. 3001, 3003 (1987) (footnote omitted) ("[t]he pre-ponderance of the evidence standard * * * is the stand-ard that is applied most frequently in litigation between private parties in every state") ; id. at 3003 n.5 ( citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 956 ( 3d ed. 1984), for the proposition that the preponderance standard ap-plies "to 'the general run of issues in civil cases'"); Her-
the same; the court of appeals' imposition of the clear and con-vincing standard finds no support whatever in this Court's prece-dents. 
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man & MacLean v. Hudaleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983). 
The preponderance standard is typically applied even 
when the defendant can lose his livelihood if the decision 
goes against him, so long as the proceeding is civil rather 
than criminal. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). 
The court of appeals' decision in this case to hold Price 
Waterhouse to the clear and convincing standard cannot 
be reconciled with this rule. The fact that the standard 
was imposed upon the defendant, rather than the plain-
tiff, makes the error all the more egregious.11 
In certain limited and unusual circumstances, the 
Court has required the plaintiff in a civil proceeding to 
prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. See 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination 
of parental rights) ; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979) (civil commitment); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (defamation); Woodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 ( 1966) (deportation; Chaunt v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) ( denaturaliza-
tion) .i:2 In these cases this Court recognized that where 
11 Because the ultimate issue in discrimination cases will often 
turn on the defendant's state of mind, the Court in Aikens analog-
ized the factual questions at issue in such cases to those presented 
in cases of misrepresentation. 460 U.S. at 716. The law of fraud, 
of course, has departed from the preponderance standard; but it did 
so by requiring the plaintiff to prove his case by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 
388 n.27. 
12 When a public body charged with violating Title VII has a his-
tory of de jure segregation, it has been held appropriate to require 
the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
challenged employment decision was made on the basis of race-
neutral criteria. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 
(1973) (citing Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 
F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966) (en bane)). This rule, of course, is 
entirely irrelevant in this case, because the district court did not 
purport to find a past history of discrimination at Price Water-
house. See Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917, 




a plaintiff seeks certa'in affirmative, coercive, interven-tions, the courts may deny their aid unless the interven-tion is shown to be warranted under a rigorous eviden-tiary standard. But in this case such an evidentiary standard was imposed on a defendant who is resisting the imposition of coercive governmental sanctions. Given the Court's insistence that Title VII cases are not differ-ent from other private rights of action, it is a startling step in the wrong direction to say to a Title VII defend-ant that it will be deemed to have violated the law, and will thus be subject to sanctions, unless it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it was not guilty of intentional discrimination. 
D. The Court Of Appeals Evaded This Court's Decision In Burdine By Improperly Characterizing This Case As One Involving "Mixed Motives." 
With virtually no supporting precedent, the court of appeals in this case adopted an approach to the burden of proof issue that makes it essentially impossible for an employer to win a Title VII case of this type. Not only did the court place the burden on the defendant employer to prove a negative-that an improper motive was not the determinative factor in the adverse employ-ment action-but it also required this showing to be accomplished by the extraordinary standard of clear and convincing evidence. More startling still, these Draconian rules were applied in a context where the evidentiary record failed wholly to provide a fair and plausible basis 
bers doctrine is applicable only in pattern or practice and disparate impact cases). See also Love v. Alamance County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1504, 1508-1510 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining the kind of de jure segregation a public body must have imposed before the Chambers doctrine becomes relevant). Given the district court's rejection in this case of all of Hopkins' comparative evidence, the discussion in Alamanace County makes clear that Hopkins could not have satis-fied the requirements it imposes even if she had sought to apply the doctrine here. 
; 
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for the conclusion that impermissible motives in fact 
played a significant causal role at all in the employment 
decision. 
In this case the court of appeals did not disturb the 
district court's findings that, first, Price Waterhouse had 
established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpre-
textual basis for its decision not to make Hopkins a part-
ner; second, Hopkins had not proved that she would have 
been made a partner in the absence of sex "stereotyp-
ing''; and third, a Title VII violation had occurred solely 
because some participants in the evaluation process (but 
not the actual decisionmakers themselves) had engaged 
in unconscious and unquantifiable sex "stereotyping" and 
because the firm had not taken steps to eliminate this 
improper element from the environment. 
The court of appeals then evaded Burdine by proceed-
ing on this impalpable basis to characterize the case as 
one where "mixed motives" were present and a shift in 
the burden of proof therefore warranted. The difficulty 
is that virtually any case can be transformed into one of 
"mixed motives" on the showing made here.13 The Bur-
dine rule, which unequivocally places the ultimate burden 
13 As discussed above (pages 7-9, supra), Hopkins' expert wit-
ness reached her conclusion that various partners' statements were 
reflections of sex "stereotyping," rather than accurate observations 
drawn from direct contact with Hopkins, even though the witness 
herself had never met Hopkins and had no knowledge whatever of 
Hopkins' bevarior at Price Waterhouse. Moreover, as Judge Wil-
liams demonstrated in his dissent (App. 31a-36a), the handful of 
statements upon which the expert relied for her "stereotyping" con-
clusion were, virtually without exception, either (1) made by Hop-
kins' supporters and therefore were unlikely to have adversely af-
fected her partnership candidacy, or (2) made at a remote time and 
about other women who did become partners, or (3) made by per-
sons outside the decisionmaking chain, so that no adverse effect on 
Hopkins could have occurred, and/or ( 4) made in a fashion so that 
the implications of the statements were either utterly benign or, 
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of persuasion in discrimination cases upon the plaintiff, 
will be effectively swallowed up by the "mixed-motive" 
exception; and the rule's evisceration is completed by the 
imposition upon the employer of the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard. 
Even if, in limited circumstances, a soundly based 
"mixed-motive" analysis is appropriate and consistent 
with Burdine, guidance from this Court is urgently 
needed concerning its proper scope. In the absence of 
such guidance, Burdine will simply disappear in a sea 
of "findings" of mixed motives. Particularly where, as 
here, the clear and convincing burden is placed upon the 
employer, the employer will have no opportunity fairly to 
contest Title VII cases based on the rules adopted by 
Congress as interpreted by this Court. 
This Court has, in other contexts, had to deal with the 
problem of erosion in the general requirement of the 
legal system that findings may not be validated on the 
basis of "expert" intuitions in the absence of fair and 
substantial support in the record as a whole. Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); and see 
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Fact, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1020 ( 1956). Such erosion will certainly take place 
here in the absence of firm insistence by this Court that a 
finding of a Title VII violation must be based, at a mini-
mum, on a fair and substantial showing in the record as 
a whole that the disputed employment decision was in 
fact caused by illegal discrimination, and that radical 
at worst, ambiguous, requiring a healthy imagination to assign il-
licit motivation to them. For example, the only supposedly stereo-typic remark made by a partner who actually opposed Hopkins' 
partnership candidacy consisted of a suggestion that she should 
take a "course at charm school." Id. at 6a, 33a. As Judge Williams observed, this remark was simply a "silly phrase" inserted in a 
much lengthier substantive comment that described Hopkins' dif-
ficult personality in terms that had "nothing to do with sex stereo-types." Id. at 33a. See also note 4, supra. 
shifts in the placement and content of the burden of 
proof, themselves triggered almost entirely on the basis 
of intuitive speculations rather than on findings as to 
the employer's actual motives, cannot substitute for such 
a showing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of 




ULRIC R. SULLIVAN 
Assistant General Counsel 
Price Waterhouse 
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10020 
(212) 489-8900 
THEODORE B. OLSON 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
1050 Connecticut A venue, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
JANUARY 1988 
PAUL M. BATOR 
Counsel of Record 
KATHRYN A. OBERLY 
DOUGLAS A. POE 
Mayer, Brown& Platt 
190 South LaSalle Street 







UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
NOS. 85-6052, 85-6097 
ANN B. HOPKINS, 
v. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 





Appeal from the United 'States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
( Civil Action No. 84-3040) 
Argued Oct. 23, 1986 
Decided Aug. 4, 1987 
Before EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, 
and JOYCE HENS GREEN,* District Judge. 
* Of the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. i§ 292 (a). 
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Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge JOYCE 
HENS GREEN. 
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS. 
JOYCE HENS GREEN, District Judge: 
In Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 
2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 ( 1984), the Supreme Court ruled 
for the first time that decisions concerning advancement 
to partnerships are governed by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and must therefore be made with-
out regard to race, sex, religion, or national origin. This 
case, the first challenge to a partnership denial to reach 
us since Hishon, presents several novel and important 
questions that arise from the application of federal em-
ployment discrimination law to collegial bodies such as 
partnerships. Following a five-day trial, the District 
Court found that Price Waterhouse, one of the nation's 
largest accounting firms, had discriminated against plain-
tiff Ann Hopkins by permitting stereotypical attitudes 
toward women to play a significant, though unquantifi-
able, role in its decision not to invite her to become a 
partner. The court concluded that Hopkins was entitled 
to an award of backpay from the date she should have 
been elected partner until the date of her resignation 
seven months later, but ruled that, notwithstanding the 
parties' agreement to defer consideration of damages un-
til after a decision on the issue of liability, Hopkins' 
failure to present any evidence as to the amount of com-
pensation she was due barred her from recovering all 
damages save attorneys' fees. The trial court further 
found that Hopkins had failed to establish that she had 
been constructively discharged following Price Water-
house's failure to make her a partner, and thus declined 
to award her backpay for the period subsequent to her 
resignation or to order Price Waterhouse to invite her 
to become a partner. The parties cross-appealed? For 
1 For the sake of convenience, the court will refer to• the parties
 
as plaintiff and defendant, rather than appellant, cross-appe
llee, 
and appellee, cross-appellant. 
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the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court's 
determination of liability, but reverse its judgment as to 
the appropriate relief and remand for further proceedings 
on this issue. 
I. 
A. Background 
Price Waterhouse is a professional partnership spe-
cializing in auditing, tax, and management consulting 
services, primarily for private corporations and govern-
ment agencies. The firm is known colloquially as one of 
the nation's "big eight" accounting firms; at the time 
this suit commenced, it had 662 partners working in 90 
offices across the country. Price Waterhouse is managed 
by a Senior Partner and Policy Board elected by all the 
partners. New partners are regularly drawn from the 
ranks of the firm's senior managers through a formai 
nomination and review process that culminates in a 
partnership-wide vote. There are no formal limits on 
the number of persons who may be made partners in any 
one year. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 
1109, 1111 (D.D.C.1985). 
Plaintiff joined Price Waterhouse as a manager in 
August 1978 and began working in its Office of Govern-
ment Services (OGS) in Washington, D.C. She specialized 
in preparing, securing, and managing contracts for large-
scale computer-based systems designed specifically for gov-
ernment agencies. Plaintiff had previously worked at 
Touche Ross, another large accounting firm where her 
husband was also employed, but left because that firm's 
rules prohibited both husband and wife from being con-
sidered for partnership. Shortly after her departure, 
plaintiff's husband became a partner at Touche Ross. In 
order to hire her, Price Waterhouse waived one of its own 
rules that barred employment of anyone whose spouse was 
a partner in a competing firm. In 1981, however, the 
firm advised plaintiff that, because of her husband's po-
sition at Touche Ross, she would not be eligible for 
partnership at Price Waterhouse. She threatened to re-
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sign and the matter was resolved only because Hopkins' 
husband left Touche Ross to set up his own consulting 
firm. Plaintiff was nominated for partnership a year 
later, in August 1982. 
There is no dispute that Hopkins was qualified for 
partnership consideration. She was exceptionally suc-
cessful in garnering business for the firm, winning con-
tract awards with the Department of :State and the 
Farmers Home Administration worth an estimated $34 
to $44 million to Price Waterhouse. The firm's Senior 
Partner, Joseph Connor, characterized one of these 
contracts-. a world-wide computerized system capable of 
handling all State Department financial transactions-as 
a "leading credential" that enabled the firm to win simi-
lar business from other federal agencies. The District 
Court expressly found that none of the other candidates 
considered for partnership in 1983 had generated more 
business for Price Waterhouse than plaintiff. 618 F.Supp. 
at 1112. In addition, she billed more hours than any of 
the other candidates under consideration. 
The partners in OGS formally initiated the admission 
process for plaintiff by nominating her for partnership 
in August 1982. In support of her candidacy OGS sub-
mitted a flattering appraisal of her work, highlighting 
her "outstanding performance" in connection with the 
State Department project, and strongly urging her admis-
sion to the partnership. The appraisal stated in part: 
In her five years with the firm, she has demonstrated 
conclusively that she has the capacity and capability 
to contribute significantly to the growth and profit-
ability of the firm. Her strong character, inde-
pendence and integrity are well recognized by her 
clients and peers. Ms. Hopkins has outstanding oral 
and written communication skills. :She has a good 
business sense, and ability to grasp and handle 
quickly the most complex issues, and strong leader-
ship qualities. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit ("Pl.Ex.") 15. 
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After a local office such as OGS nominates one of its 
senior managers for partnership, Price Waterhouse cir-
culates the nominee's name and the accompanying ap-
praisal of his or her work to all partners, who are 
invited to comment on the candidate. Those partners 
who have worked closely or extensively with a candidate 
submit "long-form" evaluations, while those whose con-
tact has been more limited submit "short-forms." Part-
ners are asked to rank individual nominees against all 
other candidates in 48 categories; to indicate whether the 
individual should be admitted, rejected, or placed on hold; 
and to provide written comments explaining their recom-
mendations. The Admissions Committee, an arm of the 
firm's Policy Board, reviews each candidate's personnel 
file and occasionally interviews individual partners who 
have commented on a given candidate. The Committee 
then prepares a summary of the evaluations and makes 
its own recommendations to the Policy Board, providing 
a short written statement explaining any recommenda-
tion to hold or reject a candidate. The Policy Board in 
turn votes on whether the candidate should be included 
on the partnership ballot, held for reconsideration, or 
rejected. The Board can override the recommendations of 
the Admissions Committee and evaluates candidates not 
only on the basis of their individual merit, but also in 
terms of the firm's business needs. Those candidates who 
receive the Board's approval are placed on the ballot for 
a partnership-wide election; those who are not included 
are informed of the Board's reasons for rejecting or post-
poning their candidacies. 
Plaintiff was the only woman among the 88 candidates 
nominated for partnership in August 1982. Of these, 4 7 
were invited to join the partnership, 21 were rejected out-
right, and the remaining 20-including plaintiff-were 
placed on hold. Seventeen of the 19 men placed on hold 
were renominated the following year (the other two had 
been placed on two-year holds), and of these, 15 were ulti-
mately admitted. OGS, however, did not renominate plain-
6a 
tiff. Of the thirty-two partners who submitted evalua-
tions and comments on her candidacy, fully a fourth 
opposed her admission; another three partners recom-
mended that she be held for reconsideration; and eight 
others stated that they lacked a sufficient basis upon 
which to form an opinion. 618 F.Supp. at 1113. Many 
of the comments from evaluating partners centered on 
Hopkins' apparent _ difficulties with staff, and both sup-
porters and opponents of her candidacy characterized 
her as sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, im-
patient with staff, and very demanding. 
A number of these complaints about plaintiff's lack 
of "interpersonal skills" were couched in terms of her 
sex. One critic suggested that Hopkins needed to take 
a "course at charm school." Pl.Ex. 21. A supporter sought 
to excuse her behavior by speculating that "she may have 
overcompensated for being a woman." Defendant's Ex-
hibit ("Def.Ex.") 31. A member of the Admissions 
Committee investigated a reference in Hopkins' personnel 
file about her use of profanity and testified that "several 
... partners" regarded her language as "one of the nega-
tives." Transcript of Trial ("Tr.") 321. One supporter 
felt compelled to defend her on this subject, arguing that 
"[m] any male partners are worse than Ann (language 
and tough personality) " ; this partner believed that the 
concerns over her profanity arose only "because she is a 
lady using foul language." Id. Another supporter opined 
that Hopkins initially came across as "macho," but con-
cluded that "if you get around the personality thing she's 
at the top of the list or way above average." Still another 
supporter wrote that plaintiff "had matured from a tough-
talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an au-
thoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
partner candidate." Pl.Ex. 21. 
Due to the large number of comments concerning her 
interpersonal skills, the Admissions Committee recom-
mended that Hopkns' candidacy be held for at least a 
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year. The Policy Board concurred, noting that although 
plaintiff had "a lot of talent," she needed "social grace." 
Pl.Ex. 20. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff met with the firm's 
Senior Partner, Joseph Connor, to discuss the Board's 
decision, and he urged her to undertake a Quality Con-
trol Review, which would allow her to work with more 
partners, demonstrate her skills, and allay concerns about 
her ability to deal with staff. Prior to that meeting, 
Thomas Beyer, the head partner at OGS and perhaps 
Hopkins' most fervent supporter, discussed with her 
problems the Board had identified with her candidacy 
and the steps she might take to enhance her partner-
ship prospects. Beyer advised her "to walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 
618 F.Supp. at 1117. 
Four months after she embarked on her Quality Con-
trol Review, however, the partners at OGS decided not 
to propose Hopkins for partnership. During the year 
following her initial nomination, Hopkins lost the sup-
port of two of these partners, who had come to strongly 
oppose her candidacy. Although candidates have on oc-
casion been admitted despite the opposition of partners 
in their home offices, plaintiff's supporters at OGS felt 
that in view of the strong criticisms her earlier nomina-
tion had drawn, she could not possibly become a partner 
without the unanimous endorsement of her local office 
partners. Beyer advised plaintiff that it was very un-
likely that she would ever be admitted to the partnership. 
He told her that she could remain at Price Waterhouse 
as a senior manager, but one of the OGS partners who 
opposed her candidacy advised her to resign. That advice 
was consistent with the regular practice and custom at 
Price Waterhouse, where candidates rejected for partner-
ship routinely left. Hopkins resigned in January 1984 
and set up her own consulting firm. 
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B. Proceedings Below 
The District Court had no difficulty finding that plain-
tiff had presented a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion: she was a qualified partnership candidate, she was 
rejected, and Price Waterhouse continued to seek part-
ners with her qualifications. 618 F.Supp. at 1113 ( citing 
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875, 104 
S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 ( 1984) ; Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 ( 1981) ) . The 
court went on to find, however, that Price Waterhouse's 
consideration of Hopkins', or any other candidate's, in-
terpersonal skills was a legitimate business inquiry, and 
that plaintiff's management style "provided ample jus-
tification for the complaints that formed the basis of the 
Policy Board's decision." 618 F.Supp. at 1114. The trial 
judge found that a number of the criticisms leveled at 
Hopkins because of her treatment of staff were in fact 
genuine. Id. In addition, the trial court concluded that 
the opposition of the two OGS partners to Hopkins' re-
nomination was likewise based on genuine reservations 
about her management style rather than any animosity 
towards her because of her sex. Id. Finally, the District 
Court rejected Hopkins' contention that Price Water-
house treated her differently than male candidates with 
abrasive or aggressive personalities. The trial judge con-
cluded that the firm had legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
business reasons for admitting two such candidates iden-
tified by plaintiff, and dismissed evidence she proffered 
as to the two other male candidates as "fragmentary" 
and otherwise insufficient proof of disparate treatment.2
 
Id. at 1115 & n. 6. 
2 The District Court also rejected Hopkins' evidence concerning 
the very small number of female partners at Price Waterhouse. 
The trial court found this evidence "wholly inconclusive" because 
it failed to indicate the percentage of female partners relative to 
the percentage of available qualified women, and failed to take 
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The trial court's finding of liability rested instead on 
its determination that Price Waterhouse had discrimi-
nated against Hopkins by filtering her partnership can-
didacy through a system that gave great weight to nega-
tive comments and recommendations, despite evidence 
that those comments reflected unconscious sexual stereo-
typing by male evaluators based on outmoded attitudes 
towards women. Id. at 1118-19. The District Court found 
that comments based on sexual stereotypes were "part 
of the regular fodder of partnership evaluations," yet 
Price Waterhouse took no steps to discourage sexism, to 
heighten the sensitivity of partners to sexist attitudes, 
or to investigate negative comments to ascertain whether 
they were the product of such attitudes. Id. at 1119. 
The trial judge acknowledged that it was impossible to 
measure the precise role sexual stereotyping had played 
in the Policy Board's decision to deny Hopkins partner-
ship, but found that the decision was in fact tainted by 
discriminatory evaluations that resulted from the firm's 
failure to root evident sexism from its evaluation system. 
Accordingly, the District Court determined that Price 
Waterhouse bore the burden of demonstrating by clear 
and convincing evidence that its decision would have been 
the same regardless of such discrimination-a showing 
the firm was unable to make. 
Having concluded that Hopkins was a victim of sexual 
discrimination, the trial judge went on to find that she 
was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the 
firm to make her a partner. Applying the doctrine of 
constructive discharge to the professional partnership 
setting, the District Court determined that Hopkins' de-
parture from Price Waterhouse was the result of neither 
intolerable working conditions nor any aggravating cir-
into account the fact that female partners presently at Price 
Waterhouse were selected over a long span of years during which 
the pool of qualified women changed dramatically. Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 618 F . Supp. 1109, 1116 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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cumstances such as a firm
 history of discrimination 
or 
undue humiliation. Id. at 1
121. Although one OGS pa
rt-
ner suggested to plaintiff 
that she resign, the firm 
of-
fered to retain her as a 
senior manager and sever
al 
partners encouraged her 
to accept this option. As
ide 
from her failed partnersh
ip bid, Hopkins had enjoy
ed 
an amicable and otherwise 
quite successful five years 
of 
employment with the firm
. The trial court conclud
ed 
that a discriminatory de
nial of partnership, with
out 
more, did not amount to a
 showing of constructive d
is-
charge and thus did not 
warrant the equitable rel
ief 
Hopkins sought. According
ly, the court denied her bo
th 
backpay from the date of 
her resignation and a dec
ree 
requiring that she be invite
d to join Price Waterhouse
 as 
a partner. The District C
ourt also ruled that althou
gh 
plaintiff had demonstrated 
her entitlement to an awa
rd 
of backpay compensating h
er at the partnership sala
ry 
for the period between he
r partnership denial and h
er 
resignation, she had failed 
to offer any evidence as to 
the 
amount of compensation s
he should receive. The tr
ial 
judge acknowledged that t
his failure was due solely
 to 
a stipulation the parties file
d in which they agreed to d
e-
fer resolution of the backp
ay issue until after the co
urt 
rendered its liability determ
ination; because that stipul
a-
tion was filed without the c
ourt's knowledge or approv
al, 
however, he deemed the is
sue closed and refused to 
ac-
cept any post-trial evidenc
e on the question. The co
urt 
therefore awarded Hopkins
 judgment in the amount 
of 




A. The Liability Determina
tion 
Price Waterhouse mounts 
two attacks on the Distric
t 
Court's determination that 
it discriminated against Ho
p-
kins in violation of Title V
II. First, the firm contend
s 
lla 
that there is no competent evidence supporting the lower 
court's finding that impermissible sexual stereotyping 
infected the partnership evaluation system. Second, Price 
Waterhouse argues that even if this finding is upheld, the 
liability determination still cannot stand because the 
lower court expressly found that Hopkins' behavior pro-
vided "ample justification" for the complaints about her 
lack of interpersonal skills, and that these complaints 
in turn constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory busi-
ness reason for placing Hopkins' candidacy on hold. 
Thus, the firm submits that even if the evaluation proc-
ess has not been purged of sexist attitudes, those at-
titudes were not responsible for the decision to hold Hop-
kins for further consideration, and therefore Hopkins 
has failed to establish any causation between the part-
nership's inappropriate treatment of female candidates 
and her own unsuccessful candidacy. 
1. The District Court's Findings 
As this court recently emphasized, appellate review of 
District Court findings in Title VII cases is necessarily 
narrow. Underwood v. District of Columbia Armory 
Board, 816 F.2d 769, 774 (D.C.Cir.1987). In order to 
overturn a determination of liability, we must conclude 
that it is "'based on an utterly implausible account of 
the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Bishopp v. District of Co-
lumbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C.Cir.1986)). Faced with 
this formidable hurdle, Price Waterhouse eschews any in-
tention of re-arguing its case on appeal: it purports to 
urge reversal not on the ground that the lower court's 
view of the evidence is implausible, but on the theory 
that there simply is no evidence supporting the District 
Court's finding of discrimination. Notwithstanding its 
disclaimer, however, defendant's attempt to demonstrate 
the absence of competent evidence proves, upon closer 
inspection, to be nothing more than a thinly disguised 
quarrel with the District Court over appropriate in-
ferences to be drawn from the evidence before it. Given 
I 
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our narrow scope of review, and the
 reasonableness of the 
District Court's findings, we must r
eject that attempt. 
In concluding that Price Waterhous
e's partnership eval-
uation system was infected by im
permissible, sexually 
stereotyped attitudes toward wome
n, the District Court 
relied on three principal pieces of e
vidence: ( 1) the com-
ments partners made about Hop
kins herself; (2) the 
testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a s
ocial psychologist and 
an expert in the field of stereotypin
g, who identified some 
of these comments as the product o
f sexual stereotyping; 
and (3) comments made about othe
r women candidates in 
previous years. Defendant attemp
ts to dismiss this evi-
dence by isolating various comme
nts and arguing that 
they are either irrelevant, sex-neu
tral, or otherwise not 
probative of discrimination. This p
iecemeal attack on the 
District Court's finding, however, ig
nores the fact that we 
must view the evidence in its entire
ty, and is in any event 
unequal to the task of demonstra
ting that the court's 
finding is clearly erroneous. Ande
rson v. City of Besse-
mer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1
504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 
518 (1985). 
Price Waterhouse argues, for examp
le, that the District 
Court could not have drawn any ad
verse inferences about 
the firm's evaluation system from 
statements describing 
Hopkins as "macho," "a somewhat
 masculine hard-nosed 
mgr," or a manager who "overcom
pensated for being a 
woman," because all these commen
ts were made by those 
favoring her candidacy. That Hop
kins' supporters made 
these statements, however, in no 
way undermines the 
District Court's finding that the
y reflect stereotypical 
thinking on the part •Of the com
menters. Stereotypical 
attitudes that sometimes work to th
e advantage of women, 
such as the once unchallenged ass
umption that mothers 
are inherently superior parents an
d thus nearly always 
entitled to custody of children in d
ivorce actions-, are no 
less the product of archaic thinkin
g than those attitudes 
that disadvantage women. The c
omments of Hopkins' 
13a 
supporters may or may not have harmed her candidacy,S 
but they are most certainly competent evidence that sexist 
attitudes were present in the partnership selection proc-
ess. Price Waterhouse also suggests that one partner's 
comment that Hopkins needed to take a "course at charm 
school" is not sex-indicative, because charm is a qualiity 
admired both in men and women. This argument borders 
on the facetious. Charm is indeed an attribute prized in 
men and women alike, but charm schools are and always 
have been exclusively female institutions.
4 The sexist im-
port of the comment is patently clear, particularly as 
charm schools are inexitricably linked, both historically 
and philosophically, with the antiquated notion thait 
women should devote their energies to social and cultural 
affairs rather than business or professional endeavors. 
See note 4 supra. 
Perhaps most telling is Price Waterhouse'•s desperate 
attempt to erase from the record Thomas Beyer's advice 
3 We do not share Price Waterhouse's emphatic conviction tha
t 
because the comments in question were made by her suppor
ters, 
they could not possibly have hurt Hopkins' partnership prospe
cts. 
Characterizing a female candidate as "macho" and "masculine
" is 
certainly one way of qualifying, and thereby diluting, an endo
rse-
ment. Supporters of a male· candidate are very unlikely to desc
ribe 
that candidate in sexual terms, i.e., as "masculine," or to excus
e 
character flaws as merely the result of "overcompensating 
for 
being a man." Indeed, plaintiff's expert, Dr. Fiske, testified 
that 
these qualifying statements re,flected a conscious effort on the 
part 
of the commenters to overcome their stereotypical attitudes 
and 
vo•te for Hopkins despite their disdain for her behavior. Tr. 
565. 
By couching their qualifications in terms of sexual stereoty
pes, 
however, these supporters echoed the complaints of Hopkins' cri
tics, 
thereby lending credence to those complaints and unwittingly un
der-
mining the support they sought to provide. 
4 "Charm school" is a somewhat derogatory colloquialism for an
 
institution formally known as a "finishing school." Webster's
 de~ 
fines the latter as "a. private school that prepares young women
 for 
social life (by emphasizing cultural accomplishments and so
cial 
graces) rather than for a vocational or professional career." W
eb-
ster's Third International New Dictionary (1968). 
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to Hopkins that she should "walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair .styled, and wear jewelry." 618 F.Supp. at 
1117. The firm argues that the District Court erred in 
stating that Beyer was "responsible for telling her what 
problems ithe Policy Board had identified with her can-
didacy." Id. Price Waterhouse claims that this task 
officially fell to the firm's Senio•r Partner, Joseph Connor, 
who made no reference to Hopkins' femininity in his 
meeting with her following the Policy Board's decision 
to hold her candidacy. This contention not only rests 
on the artificial assumption ,tha;t Beyer, the chief partner 
in Price Waterhouse's Washington office and Hopkins' 
leading supporter, would be kept completely in the dark 
as to the Policy Board's views on her candidacy, but is 
directly contradicted by the testimony of Roger Marcellin, 
a member of both the Policy Board and the Admissions 
Committee at the time of Hopkins' nomination, who 
stated that he had "no doubt that Tom Beyer would be 
the one that would have to talk with her [Hopkins]. He 
knew exactly where the problems were." Tr. 316. Bey-
er's advice, of course, speaks for itself. That he ardently 
supported her candidacy and had every motive to give 
her what he hoped would be helpful counsel simply under-
scores the genuineness of his belief that Hopkins' failure 
to behave in a manner apparently expected of a woman 
by Price Waterhouse partners had damaged her partner-
ship bid. 
The District Court also rested its finding of discrim-
inatory sexual stereotyping on the testimony of Dr. Fiske, 
an expert in the field of stereotyping, who stated that the 
disappointed stereotypical expectations of male partners 
played a "major determining role" in the firm's decision 
not to make Hopkins a partner. Tr. 545. Disclaiming any 
intention of denigrating Dr. Fiske's field of expertise, 
Price Waterhouse attempts to dismiss this evidence as 
"sheer speculation" of "no evidentiary value." Brief for 
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Appellee-Cross Appellant at 31. This is so, the firm con-
tends, because Dr. Fiske failed to compare the stereo-
typical comments made about Hopkins with similar com-
ments made abourt male candidates; she lacked informa-
tion concerning the authors of these comments; and she 
had never met Hopkins and had no idea what her conduct 
or behavior was like. However useful Price Waterhouse 
might believe this information to be, Dr. Fiske made clear 
that experts in her field do not require such data in order 
to determine whether stereotyping is occurring in a given 
employment context. Dr. Fiske testified that she was an 
expert at ,evaluating written comments, that reliance on 
such written documents was a standard practice in her 
field, and that she did not need to observe Hopkins o•r 
meet her critics because she had the entire universe of 
reaetions to Hopkins before her, as well as comments the 
same partners made about male candidates. Tr. 595-96. 
This information, along with other "convergent indi-
cators" or stereotyping-such as 1the e~tremeiy small num-
ber of female partners at the firm; the absence of any 
other female candidates among the 88 nominated along 
with Hopkins; the exaggerated and extremely intense 
negative reactions of Hopkins' critics to behavior that 
supporters perceived as positive; the ambiguous criteria 
the firm used to evaluate a candidate's personal qualities; 
the abs.ence of complaints from Hopkins' clients; and the 
positive assessments of Hopkins in areas where perform-
ance could be measured objectively, (e.g., business gen-
eraition) ----itaken together provided Dr. Fiske a sufficient 
basis from which to draw her conclusions that Hopkins 
was the victim of stereotyping. To the extent that Price 
Waterhouse believes Dr. Fiske lacked necessary informa-
tion, the firm is in fact ,quarreling with her field of ex-
pertise and the methodology it employs. Defendant, how-
ever, failed to challenge the validity of Dr. Fiske's dis-
cipline at trial and disavows any such challenge here. 
We cannot find any error in the District Court's decision 
to credit Dr. Fiske's testimony as that of an expert, or 
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the decision to rely on that testimony as evidence of 
sexual stereotyping at Price Waterhouse. 
Finally, the firm challenges- the District Court's reli-
ance on comments. partners made about other female 
candidates, contending that the trial judge intentionally 
mis-construed these statements in order to find in them 
evidence of stereotypical thinking. One partner stated 
that he could never vote for a f emaie partner. One suc-
cessful female candidate was criticized for being a "wom-
en's libber," and two other unsuccessful women were 
characterized as curt, brus.que, and abrasive; "Ma Bar-
ker"; and "one of the boys." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. It is 
of course impossible to misconstrue the sentiment behind 
a categorical opposition to all female partnership candi-
dates. Despite the fact that the firm took no steps to 
admonish this partner for his statement, which he made 
just one year before Hopkins came up for consideration, 
Price Waterhouse suggests the comment is essentially ir-
relevant because it was obviously ignored by the Policy 
Board and was "of no further concern . . . by the time 
that plaintiff was proposed." Brief for Appellee-Cross 
Appellant at 37. The firm also argues, that the comment 
about one candidate being a "women's libber" cannot be 
viewed as evidence of discrimination because the woman 
in question became a partner; Price Waterhouse simi-
larly attempts to dismiss the references describing one 
woman as "Ma Barker" and "one of the boys" as com-
ments utterly devoid of stereotypical attitudes, reflecting 
nothing more than the author's view that this particular 
woman was a "hick" who socialized too often with non-
professional staff. Thes-e arguments- miss the mark. The 
District Court did not purport to find that any of these 
comments. determined the fate of the women in question, 
reflected the views of the Policy Board itself, or had a 
direct impact on plaintiff's candidacy. Rather, ,the court 
relied on them as evidence that partners at Price Water-
house often evaluated female candidates in terms of their 
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sex. We find nothing erroneous in such reliance; on the 
contrary, we believe it is eminently correct. 
In sum, there is ample support in the record for the 
District Court's finding that the partnership selection: 
process at Price Waterhouse was impermissibly infected 
by stereotypical attitudes towards female candidates. 
2. The District Court's Legal Theory 
Price Waterhouse also challenges the liability deter-
mination below on two purely legal grounds. Firs,t, it 
contends that Hopkins did not prove "intentional" dis-
crimination on the part of the Policy Board, but only 
"unconscious" sexual stereotyping by unidentified part-
ners who participated in the selection proces,s. Second, the 
firm a,rgues that even if such a showing is sufficient to 
satisfy Title VII's intent requirement, Hopkins did not 
prove, and the District Court did n01t find, that this, un-
conscious stereotyping, or the firm's conscious failure to 
prevent it, actually caused her partnership denial. 
Hopkins claimed, and the District Court found, that 
Price Waterhouse treated her differently than the 87 male 
candidaites nominated in 1982 by subjecting her candidacy 
to :an evaluation system that the firm knew or should have 
known allowed sexual stereotypes to influence decisions 
on partnership selection. She made a substantial showing 
of the role such sexual stereotypes played in the selection 
system generally and in her own candidacy in particular 
-a showing made all the more remarkable by the educa-
tional background and sophistication of the participants 
in that system. Price Waterhouse tries to escape liability 
for this sex-based disparate treatment by arguing that 
i.t was not "intentional"-the individual partners who 
evaluated plaintiff on the basis of stereotypes, did so, un-
consciously, and plaintiff failed to show the extent to 
which this stereotyping influenced the ultimate decision-
maker in this case, the Policy Board. In so arguing, de-
fendant seeks refuge in the collegial nature of its decision-
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making body, in the subtle and insidious nature of the 
discrimination involved, and in a mistaken notion of the 
intent requirement in disparate treatment cases. 
As the .Supreme Court noted a decade ago in Inter'" 
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), dis-
parate treatment is a type of intentional discrimination 
whereby an "employer ,simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory mo-
tive is crucial, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." 
Id. at 335-36 n. 15, 97 .S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15 (emphasis 
added). Title VII is, of course, remedial rather than pu-
nitive in nature. It is designed to Temove " 'artificial, 
arbitrary and unnecessary harriers to employment where 
those barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.'" 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01, 
93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (quoting 
Griggs v. Duke. Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 
849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 ( 1971) ) . In keeping with this 
purpose, the Supreme Court has never applied the con-
cept of intent so as to excuse an artificial, gender-based 
employment barrier simply because the employer involved 
did not harbor the requisite degree of ill-will towards the 
person in question. As the evidentiary framework estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas makes clear, the require-
ments of discriminatory motive in disparate treatment 
cases does not function as a "state of mind" element, but 
as a method of ensuring that only those arbitrary or 
artificial employment barriers that are related to an em-
ployee or applicant's, race, sex, religion, or national origin 
aTe eliminated.5 Nor is this surprising, as unwitting or 
5 In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the Supreme Court noted 
that an employer's erroneous assessment of a protected applicant's 
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ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradica-
tion than blatant or calculated discrimination. 6 Hopkins 
demonstrated, and <the District Court found, that she was 
treated less favorably than male candidates because of 
her sex. This is sufficient to establish discriminatory 
motive; the fact that some or all of the partners at Price 
Waterhouse may have been unaware of that motivation, 
even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its exist-
ence nor excuses it. See Lynn v. Regents of the University 
of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n. 5 (9th Cir.1981) 
( "when plaintiffs establish that decisions regarding . . . 
employment are motivated by discriminatory attitudes re-
lating to race or sex, or are rooted in concepts which re-
flect such attitudes, however subtly, courts are obligated 
to afford the relief provided by Title VII"), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 823, 103 8.Ct. 53, 74 L.Ed.2d 59 (1982). 
Price Waterhouse nevertheless argues that Hopkins has 
failed to establish a discriminatory motive on the part 
of the actual decisionmaker in this case, the Policy Board, 
because she has not demonstrated the exact impact that 
stereotyped comments had on the Board's ultimate deci-
sion. The faulty logic upon which this contention is 
qualifications does not, by itself, subject the employer to Title VII 
liability. Such an assessment is of course an arbitrary employment 
barrier, but it is not based on the applicant's race, sex, religion, 
or national origin and is thus not within the scope. of the statute. 
Id. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096. 
6 In Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 
1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823, 103 S.Ct. 53, 74 
L.Ed.2d 59 (1982), the Ninth Circuit observed that it was once 
accepted wisdom that women were unfit to vote, practice law, or 
undertake professional careers. These beliefs were no less per-
nicious merely because those subscribing to them may not have 
suspected their own discriminatory attitudes. Today "[o]ther 
concepts reflect a discriminatory attitude more subtly; the subtlety 
does not, however, make the impact less significant or less unlawful. 
It serves only to make the courts' task of scrutinizing attitudes 
and motivation, in order to determine the true reason for employ-
ment decisions, more exacting." Id. at 1343 n.5. 
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premised, however, would, if accepted, place an enormous, 
perhaps insurmountable, burden on T'itle VII litigants 
who challenge the employment decisions of collegial bodies 
such as partnerships. It is the rare case indeed in which 
a group of sophisticated professionals such as the Policy 
Board would formally pass on the candidacy of a woman 
or other member of a protected group in the unvarnished 
terms of the Price Waterhouse partner who objected to 
all female candidates as a matter of principle. Here, 
Hopkins presented evidence that stereotypical attitudes 
towards women had manifested themselves in connection 
with the partnership bids of other women and, more im-
portantly, that these stereotypes had been brought to 
bear on her own candidacy. In addition, she offered the 
expert testimony of Dr. Fiske, who concluded that these 
attitudes played a "major" role in plaintiff's failure to 
make partner. In particular, Dr. Fiske noted that these 
stereotypical attitudes accounted for the extremely nega-
tive reactions of Hopkins' critics to behavior that other 
partners praised in her-negative reactions, moreover, 
which the Policy Board formally recognized in its recom-
mendation by stating that plaintiff needed to learn social 
grace. The District Court therefore had ample support 
for its conclusion that stereotyping played a significant 
role in blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership. 
In Burdine, of course, the Court made clear that ulti-
mately the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of intentional discrimination. While the Court noted 
that this burden requires the plaintiff to prove that "a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer," 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, it has never 
ruled definitively that the plaintiff must establish that 
impermissible discrimination was the predominant or "but 
for" motivating factor," and the circuits have divided on 
7 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 
S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), the Court stated in a footnote 
that, for purposes of proving prete-xt, a Title VII plaintiff need 
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the question.8 McDonnell Douglas and Burdine set out the 
not prove that race, was the, "sole" basis of the adverse employment 
action, adding that "no more is required to be shown than that 
race was a 'but for' cause." Id. at 282 n.10. Significantly, "[t]he 
'no more need be shown' phrase indicates that a showing of but for 
causation would be sufficient; it does not signify that such a show-
ing is necessary to prevail." Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 
F.2d 910, 921 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984) (emphasis in 
original).· Neither the majority of circuit courts nor the com-
mentators that have addressed the question have viewed the Mc-
Donald footnote, as definitive. See note 8 infra and Brodin, The 
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A 
Social Policy Perspective, 82 Col.L.Rev. 292, 302 (1982). 
More recently, the Court ruled in an analogous setting that for 
purposes of establishing an unfair labor practice under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, a showing that antiunion bias was a 
substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment decision 
is sufficient to shift to the employer the burden of proving that 
the decision would have been the same even absent such bias. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). The 
Court noted that in such mixed-motive cases, "[i]t is fair that 
[the] employer bear the risk that the influence, of legal and illegal 
motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk 
and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by 
his own wrongdoing." Id. at 403, 103 S.Ct. at 2475. 
8 Only two circuits have adopted the "but for" test of causation. 
See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915-17 (3d 
Cir. 1983) and Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 
722 (1st Cir. 1977). Four others have adopted a "substantial 
factor" test under which race or sex need not be· the determinative 
factor, as long as it had a substantial impact on the decision in 
question. See Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 
(6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must show employer's decision "more 
likely than not" motivated by impermissible criterion) ; Miles v. 
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n. 9 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff 
must show discriminatory motive was "significant or substantial 
factor" in employment decision) ; Fadhl v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (liability may be 
imposed on finding that sex was a "significant factor"); Whiting v. 
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (discrimina-
tion must be a "significant factor"). The Eighth Circuit has 
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analytical framework necessary to establish intentional 
discrimination when there is no direct evidence of such 
discrimination and, consistent with this analysis, it is 
inappropriate to require the defendant, simply on the 
basis of the inference of discrimination raised by plain-
tiff's prima facie case, to prove that discrimination was 
not the but for cause of the challenged employment deci-
sion. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (D.C. 
Cir.1983). Here. however, Hopkins has offered direct 
evidence that her gender was a significant motivating 
factor in her failure to make partner, and Price Water-
house's claim that it had other legitimate reasons for its 
decision in no way negates her showing. At this point, 
the utility of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis is 
at an end, for the question is no longer whether plaintiff 
was "treat[ed] ... less favorably than others because 
of ... [her] sex," Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15, 
97 S.Ct. at 1854 n. 15, but rather whether that less favor-
able treatment in fact caused the adverse decision she 
challenges. 
Recognizing that "[d] iscriminatory intent is simply 
not amenable to calibration," Personnel Administra.tor v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2295, 60 L.Ed. 
2d 870 ( 1979), courts have struggled to resolve the diffi-
cult questions of causation that arise in mixed-motive 
cases such as this. While most circuits have not con-
fronted the question squarely, the consensus among those 
that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff has demon-
strated by direct evidence that discriminatory animus 
played a significant or substantial role in the contested 
employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer 
adopted an even less stringent standard that permits a plaintiff to 
establish Title VII liability simply by showing that an unlawful 
motive "played some part in the employment decision." Bibbs v. 
Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis 
added). This circuit has not yet resolved the question. See Ameri-
can Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA, 716 F.2d 47, 
51 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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to show that the decision would have been the same absent 
discrimination. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 
703, 712 (6th Cir.1985) (where plaintiff shows by pre-
ponderance of evidence that decision more likely than not 
motivated by impermissible criterion, burden shifts to 
employer to show decision would have been the same); 
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n. 9 (11th Cir. 
1985) ( if plaintiff offers direct evidence that discrimina-
tion was substantial factor in decision, burden shifts to 
employer to show decision would have been the same 
absent discrimination) ; see also Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 
1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir.1985) (en bane) (once plaintiff 
shows unlawful motive played some part in decision, lia-
bility is established; def end ant may limit relief by show-
ing decision would have been the same absent discrimina-
tion); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 
F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff shows 
unlawful motive was a significant factor, liability is 
established; defendant may limit relief by demonstrating 
decision would have been the same absent discrimination). 
But see Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 
915-16 (3d Cir.1983) (plaintiff must show discriminatory 
animus was the but for cause of decision), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 266, 83 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). We 
believe that where a Title VII plaintiff has already dis-
charged her burden of demonstrating that the employ-
ment decision was based on impermissible bias, 
it is unreasonable and destructive of the purposes of 
Title VII to require the plaintiff to establish in addi-
tion the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had 
there been no discrimination, the employment deci-
sion would have been made in [her] favor. We chose 
instead to place the burden upon the employer to 
show, by "clear and convincing evidence," that the 
unlawful factor was not the determinative one. 
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Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis in original).9 
This, of course, is precisely the rule the District Court 
applied below. We believe this burden-shifting mechanism 
is appropriately invoked in a mixed-motive case such as 
this, and accordingly we find no error in the District 
Court's allocation of burdens. 
Finally, Price Waterhouse argues that the District 
Court's findings conclusively demonstrate that Hopkins' 
unappealing personality, rather than any unlawful dis-
crimination on the part of the Policy Board, was the but 
for cause of her failure to make partner. The trial judge 
expressly noted that the concerns raised over Hopkins' 
dealings with staff found support in the record and "pro-
vided ample justification for the complaints that form the 
basis of the Policy Board's decision." 618 F.Supp. at 
1114. Moreover, the judge acknowledged that because of 
Hopkins' apparent lack of interpersonal skills, "the Court 
cannot say that she would have been elected to partner-
ship if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted 
by sexually biased evaluations." Id. at 1120. Contrary to 
Price Waterhouse's contentions, however, these statements 
are not inconsistent with the court's liability determina-
9 In Toney, the court declined to apply this test, originally set 
out in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976), to an indi-
vidual claim of disparate treatment. The court noted that the 
Day v. Mathews test was typically applied in disparate, impact 
class actions in which the class plaintiffs prevailed simply by 
showing generalized discrimination in the employment unit, 
without demonstrating that each individual class member had 
actually suffered directly from that discrimination. In Toney, 
the plaintiff, in accordance with Burdine, had relied on circumstan-
tial evidence of discrimination "in the air" to prove his prima 
facie case. As we noted above, in such circumstances it is inap-
propriate to shift to the employer the burden of proving that dis-
crimination was not the determinative cause of the adverse de-
cision. Here, however, Hopkins has shown by direct evidence not 
just "background noise" of discrimination, but that "unlawful dis-
crimination had been applied against [her] in the particular em-
ployment decision [at issue]." Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis 
in original). As we explain above, this crucial finding justifies 
the burden-shifting rule we apply in this case. 
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tion. On the contrary, they are perfectly in keeping with 
the fact that this is a case of mixed-motivation. The 
District Court simply found that both plaintiff's person-
ality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her per-
sonality were significant factors in the firm's decision to 
hold her candidacy. Because Price Waterhouse could not 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that im-
permissible bias was not the determinative factor, how-
ever, the District Court properly found for Hopkins on 
the question of liability. 
B. Relief 
Turning to the question of relief, the District Court 
found that Hopkins was entitled to recover backpay from 
the date of her partnership denial until the date of her 
resignation, but disallowed any such recovery because the 
parties had attempted to bifurcate the trial and postpone 
consideration of the issue of damages without the knowl-
edge or consent of the court. With respect to post--
designation damages, the District Court found that Hop-
kins had failed to demonstrate that she had been con-
structively discharged and therefore was ineligible both 
for backpay subsequent to the date of her resignation and 
an order directing that she be made a partner. 
The facts Hopkins proffered in support of her con-
structive discharge claim are undisputed. She made clear 
both at trial and during the course of her employment 
with Price Waterhouse that consideration for partnership 
was an absolute prerequisite for any job she would take. 
Indeed, she left Touche Ross when her husband's success-
ful partnership bid eliminated her own chances for part-
nership, and she threatened to resign in 1981 when Price 
Waterhouse suggested that her husband's status as a 
Touche Ross partner might preclude her consideration for 
partnership at the firm. Nor does defendant take issue 
in any way with the District Court's finding that follow-
ing her initial failure to make partner and OGS's decision 
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not to re-propose her, it was "very unlikely" that Hopkins 
would ever become a partner at Price Waterhouse. It is 
true that plaintiff could have stayed on at the firm as a 
senior manager and that at least one partner urged her 
to do so. On the other hand, the customary and nearly 
unanimous practice at Price Waterhouse, as at most 
other accounting firms, is for senior managers who have 
been passed over for partnership to resign, and one of the 
OGS partners who strongly opposed Hopkins' candidacy 
advised her to do just that. 
In ruling that this showing did not suffice to make out 
a claim of constructive discharge, the District Court 
relied on Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981), 
where this court stated that in order to prevail on such a 
claim, an employee must establish that the employer 
"deliberately made ... working conditions intolerable 
and drove [the employee] into 'an involuntary quit.'" 
Id. at 1176 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union Local 
880 v. National Labor Relations Board, 419 F.2d 329, 
332 (D.C.Cir.1969) ). We agree that taken at face value, 
this language sets forth a stringent standard. We believe 
that the District Court's literal interpretation of that 
language was misplaced, however, in view of the under-
lying facts in Clark, as well as decisions in cases follow-
ing it. To begin with, a number of cases, including one 
relied upon by this court in Clark, have rejected the 
notion that the employer must have the specific intent of 
forcing the employee to quit. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon 
Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.1984) ; 
Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir.1982); 
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 
61, 66 (5th Cir.1980). These courts have instead held 
that it is sufficient if the employer simply tolerates dis-
criminatory working conditions that would drive a reason-
able person to resign. In addition, Clark and cases sub-
sequent to it reveal that the intolerableness of working 
conditions is very much a function of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the employee, including expectations of 
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promotion or advancement. Thus, in Clark, the court 
noted that the plaintiff, like Hopkins here, "reasonably 
expected ... opportunities for advancement" and that 
the employer's actions "essentially locked [her] into a 
position from which she could apparently obtain no re-
lief." 665 F.2d at 1174. Similarly, in Parrett v. City of 
Connersville Indiana, 737 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1145, 105 S.Ct. 828, 83 L.Ed.2d 820 
(1985), the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiff's trans-
fer, without loss of pay, from chief of detectives to line 
captain, a dead-end position requiring plaintiff to do 
virtually nothing, was a form of enforced idleness both 
humiliating and detrimental to a person with the career 
goals and ambition of the plaintiff. And in Goss, the 
Third Circuit upheld a district court's finding that an 
employer's discriminatory transfer of plaintiff to a less 
lucrative sales territory, combined with its indifferent 
response to her protests of that action, so debilitated and 
humiliated her that it amounted to a constructive dis-
charge. 747 F.2d 885. In each of these cases there were, 
of course, other indicia of discriminatory animus, but that 
is equally true here, where Hopkins faced the prospect of 
working with a number of partners, including two in her 
own office, who considered her brusque, abrasive, mascu-
line, and overly aggressive. 
We continue to adhere to the view, first s.et forth in 
Clark, that the mere fact of discrimination, without more, 
is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive dis-
charge. Similarly, we believe that discrimination is still 
best attacked within the context of existing employment 
relations. Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Hopkins 
partnership status, however, coupled with the OGS's fail-
ure to renominate her, would have been viewed by any 
reasonable senior manager in her position as a career-
ending action. Accordingly, it amounted to a construc-
tive dis.charge. We believe the District Court erred in 
ruling otherwise and rtherefore reverse that portion of its 
decision and remand the case so that the court may con-
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duct further proceedings in order to determine the appro-
priate relief. 
In assessing Hopkins' post-resignation damages, the 
District Court must of necessity consider much if not all 
of the evidence plaintiff sought to introduce in connection 
with her claim for backpay for the period between her 
partnership denial and her resignation. We believe, there-
fore, that ithe District Court, in determining damages on 
remand, should also compensate Hopkins for this period. 
In so ruling, we do not wish to condone unauthorized 
bif urea ti on of Title VII or any other actions, nor are we 
confident that we would require such a re-determination 
were it not for our remand. The District Court itself, 
however, expressly found that Hopkins was entitled to 
recover pre-resignation damages, and there is no ;sug-
gestion in the record that she wa:s in any way responsible 
for the decision to postpone the presentation of ,evidence 
in ithis issue. W,e are somewhat troubled by the fact that 
the District Court's penalty for that decision fell solely 
on plaintiff and resulted in a complete windf aII for Price 
Waterhouse, whose attorneys joined equally in the un-
authorized stipulation. In any event, the discourtesy and 
inconvenience ,to the court occasioned by the stipulation 
is largely moot in light of our remand, and we therefore 
believe iit appropriate for the court to award Hopkins the 
full relief to which she is entitled. 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court's liability determination and reverse and remand 
the case for the determination of appropriate damages 
and relief. 
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
The majority implicitly adopts a novel theory of lia-
bility under Title VII, but neither confronts the novelty 
of the theory nor gives it any intelligible bounds. Fur-
ther, as i,t must to reach the result, it bends out of recog-
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nition this court's holding in Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 
1364 (D.C.Cir.1983). These prodigies are necessary for 
the outcome because the district court's judgment cannot 
be sustained under any hitherto accepted notion of Title 
VII liability.1 
The theory is one of sexual stereotyping. See, e.g., 
Majority Opinion ("Maj.") at 465, 468, 469. An analysis 
grounding Title VII liability in such stereotypes may well 
be meritorious; but its articulation would require care. 
No one argues that Congress intended entirely to over-
turn Justice Douglas's observation thart "the two sexes 
are not fungible." BaJ,lard v. United States, 329 U.S. 
187, 193, 67 S.Ct. 261, 264, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946). Dis-
missal of a male employee because he routinely appeared 
for work in skirts and dresses would surely reflect a form 
of sexual stereotyping, but it would not, merely on that 
account, support Title VII liability. Nor, I suppose, does 
anyone contend that use of the feminine pronoun "she" 
to describe a female is a forbidden "evaluat [ion of] fe-
male candidates in terms of their sex." Maj. at 468. 
The court makes no effort to delineate the rtheory, to 
draw a line between permissible and impermissible. There 
is a good reason not rto do so: the Tecord here provided 
no causal connection between Hopkins's fate and such 
stereotyping as went on among Price Waterhous.e's 662 
partners. The evidence of sexual stereotyping 
2 is care-
fully culled from a mass of critical comments on the 
plaintiff's abrasiveness with no sex link whatever. The 
district court determined that these comments were well 
founded in fact, represented standards applied to men 
and women alike, and were ,the true basis of the firm's 
1 The majority's treatment of the relief issues, however, seems 
correct. 
2 The line between legally permissible and legally impermissible 
stereotyping has yet to be drawn. When I use· the term, I refer 
simply to whatever expressions have been so characterized by the 
district court or the majority. 
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decision. 618 F.Supp. at 1114-16. The questionable re~ 
marks consist, with one marginal exception, of two types. 
First, some of Hopkin's supporters used such stereotypes 
in speaking of her or in voicing their speculations as to 
the workings of her opponents' minds. Second, other part-
ners had used such terms in other years in speaking of 
other female candidates. Thus, though some forms of 
sexual stereotyping can be discriminatory, the instances 
here, however they may be characterized, were at most 
"generalized discrimination within rthe employment unit," 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1367, rather than discrim-
ination "in the particular employment decision for which 
retroactive relief was sought," id. at 1366 (emphasis in 
original). 
Under Texas Department of Community Affa.irs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 
L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and Toney, this, can do no more 
than establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In 
functional terms, it put upon the defendan,t the burden 
of showing that its stated reasong, were not pretextual. 
Defendant met that burden. The district court made un-
challenged findings ithat the reasons given were "not 
fabricated as a pretext for discrimination." 618 F.Supp. 
at 1114. It also found that Price Waterhouse had "legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing be-
tween the plaintiff and the male partners with whom she 
compares herself." Id. at 1115. This clearly restored the 
burden to plaintiff ,to show that she was the victim of 
unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 
S.Ct. at 1095. The district court's findings that Hopkins's 
"conduct provided ample justification for .the complaints 
[about her unpleasantness] that formed ithe basis of the 
Policy Board's decision," 618 F.Supp. at 1114, clearly 
shows that plaintiff did not meet that burden. 
The district court summarized its view of the evidence 
of discrimination in thes,e terms: 
31a 
Discriminaitory stereotyping of females was per-
mitted to play a part. [1] Comments influenced by 
sex stereotypes were made by partners; [2] the firm's 
evaluation process gave substantial weight to these 
comments; and [3] the partnership failed to address 
the conspicuous problem of stereotyping in partner-
ship evaluations. [ 4] While these three factors might 
have been innocent alone, they combined to produce 
discrimination in 1the case of this plaintiff. 
618 F.Supp. at 1120. I examine these elements, in the 
same order. 
1. Partner comments influenced by stereotypes. The 
bulk of the comments instanced as stereotyped are by 
Hopkins's supporters. One said that opponents focused on 
Hopkins' profanity "because iits [sic] a lady using foul 
language," another characterized her as "macho," and 
another said she had "matured from :a tough-talking, 
somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an authoritative, 
formidable, but much more appealing lady partner can-
didaite." Id. at 1117. The majority evidently refers to 
these as "stereotypes . .. brought to bear on [Hopkins's] 
own candidacy," Maj. at 469, but there is no reason to 
suppose they harmed it.11 The psychological speculations 
of Hopkins's boosters cannot by any stretch be "direct 
evidence that her gender was a significant motivating fac-
tor in her failure to make partner." Id. at 470. 
As for the "smoking gun" remark by her most a•rdent 
supporter, Thomas Beyer ( "walk more femininely," etc.), 
there is no reason to suppose that it represented any 
more than one partner's speculations. The district court 
was clearly erroneous, in characterizing the statement as 
having been made by Beyer in fulfillment of his "respon-
sib [ility] for telling her what problems the Policy Board 
had identified with her candidacy." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. 
3 Cf. Maj. at 466 ("The, comments of Hopkins' supporters may 
or may no.t have harmed her candidacy .... ") 
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Hopkins's own testimony showed that it was Joseph Con-
nor (Beyer's superior) who bore the responsibility for 
informing Hopkins of the reasons for the decision and 
who did so. Tr. at 87-97. Hopkins testified that Connor 
made no remarks about her sex. Id. at 95. After speak-
ing with Connor she sought Beyer's advice, along with 
that of several other partners. Id. at 98. Beyer had 
been on vacation, and he made no claim whatever to in-
side information on the discussions of the Policy Board: 
he and Hopkins "tried ito guess who some of the [ oppos-
ing partners] might be." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 
Neither her account of that conversation nor any part of 
her tesitimony contradicts the natural inference that his 
advice was just that: personal speculation as to possibly 
winning strategies. Id. at 102. Beyer's testimony con-
firms this interpretation: Connor had said nothing to 
Beyer suggesting that Hopkins' dress, walk, or any as-
pect of her personal appearance was a problem, but Beyer 
believed such a change might help. Id. at 168. He never 
articulated the basis for the belief. 
The majority tries to shore up the misconception by 
imputing to Price Waterhouse an "artificial assumption 
that Beyer ... would be kept completely in ,the dark as 
to the Policy BoaTd's views on her candidacy." Maj. at 
466. No one assumes any such thing. The issue is whether 
Beyer was summarizing the Policy Board's views or was 
offering his own helpful suggestions. The evidence of 
Hopkins and Beyer is clear that it was the latter. The 
only faint evidence the other way came from Roger Mar-
cellin, a partner in another office who did field work for 
the Policy Board. 'Tr. at 305-07. He simply assumed 
( "ha [ d] no doubt") that Beyer would be reporting 
"where the problems were." Id. ait 316. Beyer's 1and 
Hopkins's testimony on the subject makes clear that Mar-
cellin's guesswork was inaccurate. 
In the majority's most dramatic imaginative leap, the 
stereotyped language of Hopkins's supporters is said, 
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without a shred of supportive evidence, to have "len [t] 
credence to [stereotyped complaints of Hopkins's critics] 
and unwittingly undermin [ed] the support they sought 
to provide." Maj. at 466 n.3. The creativity of the prop-
osition is underscored by its building in an assumption 
that stereotyped critiques by Hopkins's opponents exist-
an assumption for which the majority identifies no record 
suppo.11t. 
The only remark by a Hopkins opponent that can be 
characterized as manifesting sexual stereotyping is, the 
facetious suggestion that she should take a "course at 
charm school." The smoke from this gun seems to me 
rather wispy. It was embedded in the following comment: 
Contacts with Ann are only casual-several mtgs at 
OGS and MMGS sessions. However, she is consist-
ently annoying and irritating-believes she knows 
more than anyone about anything, is not afraid to let 
the world know it. Suggest a course at charm school 
before she is considered for admission. I would be 
embarrassed to introduce her as a ptnr. 
Def.Exh.27. 
The substance of the remark has nothing to do with 
sex stereotypes. It fits with the many other characteriza-
tions of Hopkins '("too assertive, overly critical of others, 
impatient with her staff"; it required "diplomacy, pa-
tience and guts. to work with her"; 618 F.Supp. at 1114) 
for which, the district court found, plaintiff's "conduct 
provided ample justification," id. The objection, of course, 
is 1to the opponent's silly phrase. The reference was doubt-
less sex-linked, and the majority is not unfair in char-
acterizing it as a "somewhat derogatory colloquialism." 
Maj. at 466 n. 4. Thus it may be more "sexist" than a 
comment, such as might be made of a young man, want-
ing in character, that he ought to be "sent to military 
school." But to find discrimination by Price Waterhouse 
based simply on this remark is "utterly implausible." See 
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Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. 
Cir.1986) ( discussing criteria for disregarding district 
courts' findings of fact in Title VII cases). 
The district courit and the majority take refuge in 
comments made by Price Waterhouse partners in evalua-
tions of other women in other years. 618 F.Supp. at 1117; 
Maj. at 467-468. These included one plainly beyond the 
pale--a remark by a partner that he "could no,t consider 
any woman seriously as a partnership candidate and be-
lieved that women were not even capable of functioning 
as senior managers." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. So we know 
that, at least at some time in the past, there was one 
male chauvinist pig rampant among the Price Water-
house partners. But there is no evidence that this troglo-
dyte ever influenced a single other partner. His comment 
was not repeated after 1981, perhaps because the informal 
atmosphere in the firm made such remarks unacceptable. 
In any event, no one claims he played any role in the 
relevant evaluation. 
The other remarks (still relating to other evaluations 
in other years) are ambiguous. For instance, it had been 
said of one woman candidafo that she acted too much 
like "one of the boys," 618 F.Supp. at 1117, but this was 
apparently a criticism of her for socializing too much 
with the clerical staff and not enough with the profes-
sionals. Def.Exh. 64, tab 22. Even the majority recog-
nizes that these remarks had no "direct impact on plain-
tiff's candidacy." Maj. at 468. But it takes them as evi-
dence that partners at Price Waterhouse "often evaluate 
female candidates in terms of their sex." Id. 
In a case where alleged sexual stereotyping had a 
demonstrable connection to the plaintiff, a careful analy-
sis of such remarks would be in order. Such an analysis 
would begin with the recognition that not all sex-based 
phrases are sexist. Our vocabulary is full of such 
phrases, some of which have gradually detached them-
selves from any genuine link to sex, or even switched sex. 
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Thus "doll," originally a slang phrase for a "conven-
tionally pretty and shapely young woman, ... whose func-
tion is fo elevate the status of a male and to inspire gen-
eral lust," see NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 108 
(R. Chapman ed. 1986), has come in some contexts to refer 
to any "notably decent, pleasant, generous p€rson," as in 
"Isn't he a doll?" That is the way language evolves, 
especially in a lively, spontaneous culture such as ours. 
Words themselves are metaphors, and it is in their nature 
to acquire meanings completely detached from original, 
concrete detail, whether or not sex related. Thus the 
phrase "BS" clearly relies on no distinction between cows 
and bulls. 
Here, the phrase "one of :the boys" was used in a sex-
neutral sense: it was used of a. woman, .and since it 
evidently ref erred to her camaraderie with clerical staff 
at Price Waterhous,e, the statistical probability is over-
whelmingly that they were predominantly women. The 
phrase's connotation of easy familiarity (an "ordinary, 
amiable man ... without side or lofty dignity; = ORDI-
NARY JOE: His Eminence was trying to be one of the 
boys," id. at 305) easily escapes its masculine origins. 
The phrase does not manifest sexism, notwithstanding 
the solemn avowals of the plaintiff, the district court and 
the majority. 
But this case does necessitate a study of just what 
expressions Congress may have wished to wash from the 
American tongue. The remark related to another can-
didate in another year. It plainly was not "direct evi-
dence that [Hopkins's] gender was a significant moti-
vating factor in her failure to make partner." Maj. at 
470. 
In discussing sex stereotyping, the district court gave 
great weight to the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a wit-
ness purporting to be an expert in that field. She claimed 
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to be able to find forbidden stereotyping simply by read-
ing partners' comments-without information about the 
truth of the matters commented upon. Of course where 
the remarks themselves carry such a tint (if, for ex-
ample, a commenter had said, "She's too masculine"), 
anyone could do so. But (apart from the "charm school" 
remark) no Hopkins detractor said any such thing. Dr. 
Fiske's expertise rose to the occasion. Her arts enabled 
her to detect sex stereotyping based largely on "the 
intensity of the negative reaction." Tr. at 559. So if an 
observer characterized someone as "overbearing and ar-
rogant and abrasive and running over people," an expert 
such as Dr. Fiske could discern-and would, if the sub-
ject were a woman-that they stemmed from uncon-
scious stereotypes. Dr. Fiske could do this without meet-
ing the subject of the comment or making any inquiry 
into a possible factual basis. Id. at 569, 595-97. To an 
expert of Dr. Fiske's qualifications, it seems plain that 
no woman could be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive: 
any observations to that effect would necessarily be dis-
counted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like 
this is to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base 
any adverse action as to a woman on such attributes. 
2. The evaluation process gave weight to such com-
ments. This generalization suffers precisely the defect 
of the first leg of the tripod of liability: it depends 
entirely upon comments that could have adversely af-
fected Hopkins. Either they related to other candidacies 
in other years, or they represented her supporters' views 
or intuitions about her adversaries. All we have that 
connects in any potentially adverse way with Hopkins is 
the "charm school" remark.4 
4 If this leg is in any way based on the firm's procedure of giv-
ing substantial weight to- "no" votes, it is inconsistent with the 
district court's prior finding that "the firm's practice of giving 
'no' votes great weight treated male and female candidates in the 
same way." 618 F.Supp. at 1116. See Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 
F.2d 80, 85 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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3. Neglect of duty to address problem of stereotyping. 
Key to the district court's finding of liability was Price 
Waterhouse's failure to institute special programs for 
sensitizing partners to sex stereotyping, or otherwise 
to stamp it out of the evaluation process. 618 F.Supp. at 
1120. This breaks new ground, blithely free of any ef-
fort to link it to any established legal principles. Nor 
is the new theory intelligibly defined. What set of facts 
triggers the duty? If such an omission is to ground li-
ability, perhaps the plaintiff should bear an initial bur-
den of demonstrating that gender stereotyping was more 
probably than not the cause of the adverse employment 
decision. The majority, like the district court, fails to 
clarify this important issue, perhaps because it is so 
clear that Hopkins failed to make such a showing. 
From the facts here, it looks as though the duty to 
sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are serious. 
The more delicate the trigger, the more completely this 
court has dropped the requirement of intentional dis-
crimination out of the law. As few employers can say 
with confidence that those who run its hiring and promo-
tion are one hundred percent free of what may later be 
characterized as forbidden stereotyping, the only safe 
course will be to institute programs of the sort approved 
by the district court. The rule turns Title VII from a 
prohibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for 
rooting out sexist thoughts. 
4. Innocent alone, the three factors combined to pro-
duce discrimination in the case of this plaintiff. Such 
alchemy is mysterious. Having found that specific com-
plaints caused the Policy Board's adverse decision and 
that there was ample justification for the complaints, 
the district court took up the allegations of stereotyping 
floating in the Price Waterhouse ether and the remark-
able intuitions of Dr. Fiske. 618 F.Supp. at 1117-20. 
The court began on a cautious note-some negative com-
ssa 
ments on Hopkins "might be attributed to sex stereotyp-
ing." Id. at 1118. It next determined that the com-
menters "may have been influenced by a sex bias." Id. 
It then progressed from "might" to "did," but never 
revealed how it reached the final ipse dixit. 
The evidence here establishes at most the existence of 
sexist attitudes. Thus there can be no doubt that this 
court's decision in Toney v. Block controls. The showing 
of "generalized discrimination" can at the most establish 
a prima facie case, requiring defendant to meet its bur-
den of showing non-pretextual grounds for its action. 
The district court properly found those established, re-
storing the burden to plaintiff. 
The majority would eviscerate Toney by a clever name 
change: calling the case one of mixed motive, the ma-
jority looks to precedents in related areas where a party 
acting with one permissible motive and one unlawful one 
may prevail only by affirmatively proving that it would 
have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive were 
absent. I have no quarrel with this principle. See Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76 
L.Ed.2d 667 ( 1983) ; Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 
568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). But it has no rele-
vance where, as here, discrimination has "not been spe-
cifically attributed to the employment decision of which 
the plaintiff complains." Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366. Toney 
does not permit a plaintiff to invoke the "mixed motive" 
concept whenever ( 1) he or she has shown only back-
ground evidence of some generalized discrimination and 
(2) defendant has proven that a non-pretextual reason 
"formed the basis" of the act. If this court is to deep-
six Toney, it should do so en bane. 
There is not enough evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation to support a verdict for Hopkins under any es-
tablished approach to Title VII liability. The stereotype 
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theory adopted by the district court should not be al-
lowed to spring to life in a case where its occurrence 
is not plausibly related to the decision on plaintiff. If a 
court is to develop such a theory, it should do so in a 
context where it and the parties properly focus on what 
elements of sexual differentiation Congress may have 
sought to stamp out. If failure to provide sensitivity 
training is to be a ground of Title VII liability, there 
should be some illumination of the circumstances trig-
gering the duty. And if Toney is to be overturned, it 
should not be by a panel of this court. I dissent. 
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Civ. A. No. 84-3040 
ANN B. HOPKINS, 
v. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE, 
Sept. 20, 1985 
MEMORANDUM 
GESELL, District Judge. 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff was proposed for partnership in Price Water-
house, a nationwide professional partnership, but was 
held for further consideration at the next annual partner-
ship selection. The following year the partners in the unit 
where she worked decided not to propose her a second 
time. Plaintiff then resigned and filed this suit alleging 
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2. The Court is asked to order that she be made 
a partner and to award back pay and other monetary 
relief. A bench trial lasting four and one-half days fol-
lowed extensive discovery. After receiving proposed find-
ings of fact, further briefs, and hearing full argument, 
the Court reaches the following findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. 
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Background 
Price Waterhouse is a partnership that specializes in 
providing auditing, tax and management consulting serv-
ices primarily to private corporations and government 
agencies. At the time this action was filed, Price Water-
house had 662 partners operating in 90 offices scattered 
across the nation. Its partners are certified public ac-
countants and other specialists. 
Despite its size and geographic dispersal, Price Water-
house has consistently sought to maintain the traditional 
characteristics of a professional partnership both in its 
management and partnership selection practices. Partners 
manage the firm through a Senior Partner and Policy 
Board elected by all the partners. New partners are regu-
larly selected from the ranks of the partnership's senior 
managers through an elaborate recommendation and re-
view process that culminates in a partnership-wide vote 
in which the successful candidates are approved. There is 
no limitation on the number of partners who may be 
selected in any one year. 
The admissions process takes place annually and begins 
when the partners of each local office may propose that 
one or more senior managers from their office be con"• 
sidered as partnership candidates. Partners in the local 
offices draft written recommendations based on a detailed 
consideration of the candidates' qualifications. These pro-
posals are distributed to all of the firm's 662 partners 
and each partner is invited to submit evaluation forms 
on any candidate about whom the partner may have 
information. Partners who have significant and recent 
contact with the candidate submit "long-form" evaluations 
and partners who only have a limited basis upon which 
to evaluate the candidate submit "short form" evalua-
tions. These forms ask the partners to rank the candi-
dates relative to other recent partnership candidates in 
48 different categories ranging from practice development 
and technical expertise to interpersonal skills and partici-
i.:- - --
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pation in civic activities. The numerical rankings in this 
exhaustive list of relevant, neutral criteria is supple-
mented by asking the partners to indicate whether they 
believe the candidate should be admitted to the partner-
ship, denied partnership or held for further considera-
tion and asking them to provide a short comment explain-
ing their assessment. 
The Admissions Committee reviews each candidate's 
personnel file and members of the Committee make visits 
to some local offices to interview partners who have com-
mented in order to determine more precisely the basis for 
their views on the candidates. The Admissions Commit-
tee then prepares a summary of the evaluations and other 
information and makes its recommendations to the Policy 
Board. If the recommendation is to "hold" a candidate 
for reconsideration in a later year or a "no" recommenda-
tion denying admission, the Committee prepares a short 
written statement summarizing its reasons. 
The Policy Board reviews the recommendations of the 
Admissions Committee and votes to include a candidate on 
the partnership ballot, to "hold" the candidate, or to deny 
partnership. While the Admissions Committee's recom-
mendations focuses primarily on the qualifications of the 
individual candidate, the Policy Board may occasionally 
interject business considerations and decide to recom-
mend a candidate because of the firm's need for a par-
ticular type of partner or a particular skill. The candi-
dates recommended by the Policy Board are submitted to 
the entire partnership for election, and candidates who 
are not included on the ballot are informed of the Board's 
reasons for rejecting their candidacy. Candidates who 
have been held may be reproposed in later years and the 
review process begins again. Price Waterhouse made 
every document generated by this admissions process on 
candidates proposed for admission in 1982, 1983 and 
1984 available to the plaintiff during the course of 
discovery in this case. 
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In 1982 the plaintiff was proposed for partnership by 
her office, the Office of Government Services ( OGS) , which 
specializes in designing and implementing consulting and 
management projects for government agencies. Plaintiff 
was the only woman among the 88 candidates for partner-
ship that year. All of the partners in OGS at that time 
were men. Indeed, as of July, 1984 only seven of the 662 
partners at Price Waterhouse were women. 
Plaintiff had had a successful career as a senior man-
ager in OGS and had played a significant role in develop-
ing business for the firm. She played a key role in Price 
Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million dol-
lar contract with the Department of State. Afterwards, 
she helped prepare a proposal and manage a project for 
a computerized system to handle the State Department's 
real property worldwide and successfully managed the 
preparation of a competitive proposal for a computer sys-
tem to track loans of the Farmers' Home Administration. 
She had no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients 
appear to have been very pleased with her work. None of 
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that 
year had a comparable record in terms of successfully 
securing major contracts for the partnership. The part-
ners in the OGS office fully endorsed her proposal for 
partnership. She was generally viewed as a highly com-
petent project leader who worked long hours, pushed vig-
orously to meet deadlines and demanded much from the 
multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked. 
The comments submitted to the Admissions Committee, 
however, indicated that plaintiff had problems with her 
"interpersonal skills;" specifically, she had trouble in deal-
ing with staff members. Eight of the thirty-two partners 
who submitted evaluations recommended that she be de-
nied admission, three favored holding her for reconsidera-
tion, and eight indicated that they had insufficient basis 
for an opinion. Supporters and opponents of her can-
didacy indicated that she was sometimes overly aggressive, 
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with 
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1ff.1 She sometimes used profanity and appeared to be 
insensitive to others. These negative comments and the 
significant number of "no" votes, most of which were by 
partners filing short forms because of their limited con-
tact with the plaintiff, were determinative in the Admis-
sion Committee's decision to recommend "that she 
should be HELD at least a year to afford time to demon-
strate that she has the personal and leadership qualities 
required of a partner." 2 After a full discussion the Pol-
icy Board adopted this recommendation. 
After learning that her candidacy had been put on hold 
plaintiff, at the urging of the Senior Partner, underwent 
a Quality Control Review in order to improve her chances 
of making partner the next year. Several partners indi-
cated that they planned to give the plaintiff opportunities 
to demonstrate her abilities and receive more exposure. 
However, these partners never followed through on their 
plans and the favorable results of the Quality Control 
Review came too late because just four months after the 
Policy Board's recommendations the partners in OGS de-
cided not to repropose the plaintiff for partnership. By 
that time, two partners in the OGS office strongly op-
posed her candidacy. Without strong support within that 
office, it was felt that her candidacy could not possibly be 
successful. 
After the decision not to repropose, the plaintiff was 
advised that it was very unlikely that she would be ad-
mitted to partnership. Rather than waiting to try again 
or accepting an offer to remain as a senior manager, she 
resigned from Price Waterhouse in January, 1984. After 
pursuing the appropriate administrative remedies she 
brought this action. 
Discussion 
From the outset Price Waterhouse has conceded that 
plaintiff was qualified to be considered for partnership 
1 Plf. Ex. 21. 
2 Plf. Ex. No. 19; Tr. 267-68. 
1L " ' 
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and1 probably would have been admitted but for the com-
plaints about her interpersonal skills. Consequently, there 
is no dispute that the plaintiff has presented a ]Yf'ima 
facie case under Title VII by showing that she was a 
qualified partnership candidate, she was rejected, and 
Price Waterhouse continues to seek partners with her 
qualifications. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 
U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2799, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 ( 1984) ; 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253 & n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 & n. 6, 67 L.Ed. 
2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 
( 1973). The only dispute between the parties is whether 
Price Waterhouse's concerns about the plaintiff's inter-
personal skills present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason to deny partnership or constitute a pretext to dis-
guise sex discrimination. 
Plaintiff advanced three arguments for maintaining 
that the decision was discriminatory: ( 1) the criticisms 
of plaintiff's interpersonal skills were fabricated; (2) 
even if the firm believed her interpersonal skills were 
deficient, Price Waterhouse has routinely admitted male 
candidates with interpersonal skills problems if they had 
strong qualifications in other areas and would have ad-
mitted her if she had not been a woman; (3) the criti-
cisms of the plaintiff's interpersonal skills for a product 
of sexual stereotyping by male partners and the firm's 
partnership selection process improperly gave full weight 
to these discriminatory evaluations. Price Waterhouse 
denies these allegations and claims that plaintiff was 
properly denied partnership because the firm, for legiti-
mate business reasons, seeks to avoid having abrasive 
partners who might jeopardize morale and be incapable 
of successfully supervising staff as they move among 
different locations in response to work demands. Al-
though plaintiff's arguments are closely interrelated, it is 
necessary to examine them separately. 
i 
i c - --
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1. Fabrication of Complaints About Interpersonal Skills. 
The interpersonal skills of prospective partners was 
properly an important part of Price Waterhouse's written 
partnership evaluation criteria. Inability to get along 
with staff or peers is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for refusing to admit a candidate to partnership. Cf. 
Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 
37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1862 (3d Cir.1985); 
Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 (1st 
Cir.1984), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 105 S.Ct. 433, 
83 L.Ed.2d 359 ( 1984) ; Burrus v. United Telephone of 
Kansas, 683 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633 
(1982). 
It is clear that the complaints about the plaintiff's in-
terpersonal skills were not fabricated as a pretext for 
discrimination. Even the plaintiff admitted that she is a 
"hard-driving" manager who pushes her staff and oc-
casionally uses profanity.3 Contemporaneous records of 
counseling sessions and evaluations conducted well before 
the plaintiff was proposed for partnership indicate that 
partners found her too assertive, overly critical of others, 
impatient with her staff, and counselled her to soften her 
image.4 At the time, plaintiff indicated that she agreed 
with many of these criticisms. Even partners who 
strongly supported her partnership candidacy acknowl-
edged these deficiencies, although in more muted tones, 
when emphasizing the high quality of her work and her 
value to the firm. Staff members who testified on the 
plaintiff's behalf indicated that she was an effective man-
ager but her hard-driving style might be regarded as 
"controversial" and it required "diplomacy, patience and 
guts" to work with her.5 Plaintiff's conduct provided 
3 Tr. 44, 52. 
4 Def.Ex. No. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 24, 25. 
5 Tr. 423, 434. 
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ample justification for the complaints that formed the 
basis of the Policy Board's decision. 
Plaintiff also alleges that the two OGS partners who 
blocked reproposing her after the Policy Board held her 
candidacy for reconsideration falsified their reasons to 
hide their discriminatory motives. There is not sufficient 
proof to support this allegation. One partner recom-
mended that she be put on hold when she was first pro-
posed and apparently opposed reproposal because he found 
her disagreeable to work with and had reservations about 
her technical skills and dedication to the firm. Although 
there is some suggestion that this partner may have held 
a personal grudge against the plaintiff, there is no proof 
that his position was animated by animosity toward her 
sex. 
The second partner supported the plaintiff when she 
was first proposed, but changed his position after receiv-
ing additional criticism of her management style from 
staff members, having several conversations with the 
plaintiff, and reflecting on his previous experience with 
her work. His decision to oppose the plaintiff's candidacy 
put him in the uncomfortable position of being in direct 
conflict with the head partner in the office, who was one 
of the plaintiff's biggest boosters. Although the plaintiff 
disputes his version of the events that led him to change 
his vote, the Court found him to be a credible witness 
and accepts his account of these events. Plaintiff has 
failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the explana-
tions given by these two partners were pretextual. 
As a result, plaintiff has failed to show that the deci-
sion of the OGS partners not to repropose her was dis-
criminatory. While offers from several partners to ar-
range assignments which might have improved her chances 
for partnership never materialized and no one made any 
effort to check on the plaintiff's current relationship with 
staff members after she was placed on hold, the evidence 
before the Court indicates that this was due to the timing 
48a 
of the partnership evaluation process rather than any 
discriminatory motives. Only a few months separated the 
announcement that plaintiff had been placed on hold and 
the vote not to repropose her so the firm had little oppor-
tunity to change plaintiff's assignment or do a thorough 
investigation into her subsequent relationships with staff. 
The decision not to repropose was due to the unexpected 
position taken by the two partners discussed above and 
plaintiff has not proven that their actions were discrimi-
natory. 
2. Balancing Interpersonal Skills Against Other 
Qualifications. 
Plaintiff alleges that even if there were problems with 
her interpersonal skills she was so highly qualified in 
every other respect that the firm would have made her a 
partner if it had not discriminated against her because 
of her sex. She claims that the Policy Board invariably 
admits men who have interpersonal skills problems and 
comparing her "superb" record with that of these men 
show that she is a victim of classic disparate treatment. 
Price Waterhouse does not concede that interpersonal 
skills were the plaintiff's sole deficiency, but it admits 
that they were the principle and determinative reason for 
the firm's decision. Nonetheless, Price Waterhouse claims 
that the male candidates that the plaintiff points to are 
not comparable and do not indicate disparate treatment. 
,Fortunately the Court does not have to engage in the 
difficult task of second-guessing the Policy Board's bal-
ancing of professional skills of candidates from different 
years in order to resolve this allegation. The contempo-
raneous records generated by the partnership selection 
procedure demonstrate that Price Waterhouse had legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing be-
tween the plaintiff and the male partners with whom she / 
compares herself. 
From past partnership admissions records the plaintiff 
has identified two male candidates who were criticized for 
! 
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their int<1rpersonal skills because they were perceived as 
being aggressive, overbearing, abrasive or crude, but were 
recommended by the Policy Board and elected partner. 
Price Waterhouse points out that in both cases the Policy 
Board expressed substantial reservations about the candi-
dates' interpersonal skills but ultimately made a "busi-
ness decision" to admit the candidates because they had 
skills which the firm had a specific, special need and the 
firm feared that their talents might be lost if they were 
put on hold. In one case the Policy Board rejected a 
"hold" recommendation by the Admissions Committee be-
cause of business considerations. In addition, these candi-
dates received fewer evaluations from partners recom-
mending that they be denied partnership and the negative 
comments on these candidates were less intense than 
those directed at the plaintiff.~ 
The significance of "no" votes and negative comments 
warrants some further comment. In the course of this 
trial, Price Waterhouse has been very forthcoming in 
providing information on its partnership section process. 
The evidence as a whole indicates that over the years the 
firm has consistently placed a high premium on candi-
dates' ability to deal with subordinates and peers on an 
interpersonal basis and to promote cordial relations within 
a firm which is necessarily dependent on team effort. Not 
only are candidates regularly held because of concerns 
about their interpersonal skills-the Policy Board takes 
any evaluations recommending denial of partnership or a 
negative reaction on this basis very seriously. Despite 
6 Def.Ex. Nos. 73, 83, 84; Plf.Ex. No. 20. In post-trial briefing, 
the plaintiff sought to raise two additional examples. The evidence 
before the Court on these candidates is fragmentary, at best, 
consisting of comments taken out of context, statistical summaries 
of their evaluation forms and brief notes. From this limited evi-
dence it appears that these candidates also evoked fewer and less 
intense negative comments than the plaintiff. The Court finds that 
the plaintiff has not provided sufficient proof to demonstrate dis-
parate treatment based on these candidates. 
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the fact that the negative comments of short form evalua-
tions are often in sharp contrast to the glowing reports 
of partners who have had extensive contact with the 
candidate, such comments are treated as serious reserva-
tions and given great weight. "No" votes, even from 
short form commentors who may only have had very 
limited contact with the candidate, often result in a "no" 
or "hold" decision. 
Thus, while plaintiff argues that her accomplishments 
in generating business, management and client satisfac-
tion were so far above average that she would have been 
admitted despite any interpersonal skills problems if Price 
Waterhouse had honestly balanced all her qualifications, 
Price Waterhouse responds by pointing out that she re-
ceived very few "yes" votes and more "no" votes than all 
but two of the 88 candidates that year. These no votes 
and negative comments, largely from partners outside 
OGS, effectively placed the plaintiff toward the bottom 
of the candidate pool. Regardless of its wisdom, the 
firm's practice of giving "no" votes great weight treated 
male and female candidates in the same way. "The 
issue in a case of alleged failure to hire or promote is 
not the objective superiority or inferiority of the plain-
tiff's qualifications, but rather whether the defendant's 
selection criteria-be they wise or foolish-are nondis-
criminatory." Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 85 n. 3 
(D.C.Cir. 1985). The Court finds that the firm's em-
phasis on negative comments did not, by itself, result in 
any discriminatory disparate treatment. 
Plaintiff tried to reinforce her claim of disparate treat-
ment with a number of statistics that proved wholly in-
conclusive. Plaintiff attempted to show that the small 
number of women partners at Price Waterhouse indicates 
discrimination but her proof lacked sufficient data on the 
number of qualified women available for partnership and 
failed to take into account that the present pool of 
partners have been selected over a long span of years 
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durmg which the pool of available qualified women has 
changed. Women have only recently entered the account-
ing and related fields in large numbers and there is evi-
dence that many potential women partners were hired 
away from Price Waterhouse by clients and rival account-
ing firms. 
Although women partnership candidates have been 
elected to partnership at a slightly lower rate than men 
(60% versus 68%), the difference is not statistically 
significant. The other statistical studies presented by 
plaintiff only bear an indirect relationship to Price Water-
house's practice in partnership selection, and when cor-
rected to examine the appropriate comparisons, lack statis-
tical significance. No conclusion can be drawn from this 
fragile data. 
3. Stereotyping and the Partnership Selection Process. 
Plaintiff's final argument begins with the allegation 
that the male partners who criticized her interpersonal 
skills applied a double standard. She claims that she was 
not evaluated as a manager, but as a woman manager, 
based on a sexual stereotype that prompts males to regard 
assertive behavior in women as being more offensive and 
intolerable than comparable behavior in men because some 
men do not regard it as appropriate "feminine" behavior. 
Plaintiff claims that this type of sexual stereotyping is 
reflected in comments about her aggressiveness and pro-
fanity that indicate she was being evaluated as a woman 
and not simply as a partnership candidate. One com-
mentator said "she may have overcompensated for being 
a woman." Another suggested that she needed to take a 
"course at charm school." Supporters indicated that her 
critics judged her harshly due to her sex. One acknowl-
edged "Ann has a clearly different personality," but 
"[m] any male partners are worse than Ann (language 
and tough personality)," and people were only focusing on 
her profanity "because its a lady using foul language." 
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Another conceded that she initially came across as 
"macho" but said, "if you get around the personality 
thing she's at the top of the list or way above average." 
Another defended her by saying, "she had matured from 
a tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to 
an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing 
lady partner candidate." '7 When plaintiff consulted with 
the head partner at OGS, who was her strongest sup-
porter and responsible for telling her what problems the 
Policy Board had identified with her candidacy, she was 
advised to walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.8 
.Some comments on other women partnership candidates 
in prior years support the inference that the partnership 
evaluation process at Price Waterhouse was affected by 
sexual stereotyping. Candidates were viewed favorably if 
partners believed they maintained their f emini ty while 
becoming effective professional managers. To be identified 
as a "women's liber" was regarded as negative comment. 
Nothing was done to discourage sexually biased evalua-
tions. One partner repeatedly commented that he could 
not consider any woman seriously as a partnership candi-
date and believed that women were not even capable of 
functioning as senior managers-yet the firm took no 
action to discourage his comments and recorded his vote 
in the overall summary of the evaluations. Besides the 
plaintiff, the Admissions Committee rejected at least two 
other women candidates because partners believed that 
they were curt, brusque and abrasive, acted like "Ma 
Barker" or tried to be "'one of the boys'." Comments 
suggesting that sex stereotypes may have influenced the 
partners' evaluations of interpersonal skills were not 
7 Plf.Ex. No. 21; Def.Ex. No. 30, 31; Tr. 321. 





frequent, but they appear as part of the regular fodder 
of the partnership evaluations.I' 
Plaintiff presented a well qualified expert, Dr. Susan 
Fiske, who has done extensive research and study in the 
field of stereotyping. Dr. Fiske examined the partners 
comments about the plaintiff and other partnership can-
didates and gave opinions as to the possible presence of 
sex stereotyping. Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able 
to determine whether or not any particular reaction was 
determined by the operation of sex stereotypes. However, 
she did identify comments that she believed were in-
fluenced by sex stereotypes. Dr. Fiske stated that in her 
opinion unfavorable comments by male partners, slanted 
in a negative direction by operation of male stereotyping, 
were a major factor in the firm's evaluation of the plain-
tiff. But she could not pinpoint the degree to which stereo-
typing had influenced the selection process. 
That deep within males and females there exist sexu-
ally based reactions to the personal characteristics of 
one of the opposite sex surely comes as no surprise. It is 
well documented that men evaluating women in man-
agerial occupations sometimes apply stereotypes which 
discriminate against women.110 Indeed, the subtle and un-
conscious discrimination created by sex stereotyping ap-
pears to be a major impediment to Title VII's goal of 
9 Def.Ex. No. 63. 
10 See, e.g., Ruble•, Cohen and Ruble, Sex Stereotypes: Occupa-
tional Barriers for Women, 27 Amer.Behav.Sc. 339 (1984) (sur-
veying literature,) ; R.M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 
CORPORATION 206-42 (1977) (reporting results of study) ; 
Rosen and Jerdee·, Perceived Sex Differences in Managerial Rele-
vant Characteristics, 4 Sex Roles 837 (1978) (same); Rosen and 
Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 
59 J.Appl.Psych. 9 (1974) (same); Schein, The Relationship Be-
tween Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Character-
istics, 57 J.App.Psych. 95 (1973) (same). 
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ensuring equal employment opportunities.11 Dr. Fiske 
testified that situations, like that at Price Waterhouse, in 
which men evaluate women based on limited contact with 
the individual in a traditionally male profession and a 
male working environment foster stereotyping. One com-
mon form of stereotyping is that women engaged in as-
sertive behavior are judged more critically because ag-
gressive conduct is viewed as a masuculine characteristic.:12 
Establishing a claim of disparate treatment based on 
subjective evaluations requires pr of of discriminatory 
motive or purpose. International Brothe';-hood of Team~ 
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 835 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 
1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 ( 1977). The Court finds 
that while stereotyping played an undefined rote in block-
ing plaintiff's admission to the partnership in this in-
stance, it was unconscious on the part of the partners who 
submitted comments. The comments of the •individual 
partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not 
prove an intentional discriminatory mot,ive or purpose. 
A far more subtle process is involved when one who is 
in a distinct minority may be viewed differently by the 
majority because the individual deviates from an artificial. 
standardized profile. Even in examining the comments 
months later at trial, it is impossible to label any par-
ticular negative reaction as being motivated by inten-
tional sex stereotyping. Business women who earn a place 
at the highest ranks of their profession by combining • 
ability with a strong persistent effort to ·succeed fre .. i 
quently sense antagonism from some male colleagµ,es 
• • 
11 See Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per 
Se As A Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L.Rev. 345, 
349-61 (1980). 
12 See, e.g., Wiley and Eskilson, Coping in the Corporation, Se~ • 
Role Constraints, 12 J.App.Soc.Psych. 1, 8 (1982); Prather: W~ 
Can't Women Be More Like Men: A Summary of the Sociopsy-
chological Factors Hindering Women's Advancement in the Pro-
fessions, 15 Am.Beh.Sc. 172 (1971). 
• 




whose contact with the working female as an equal has 
been limited. However, considering the infinite variety of 
work conditions; differences in experience, education and 
perceptions among individuals in working encounters; as 
well as the fact that the interactions of personalities of 
either sex are as complex and inscrutable and as infinite 
as combinations of genes will produce, it is impossible 
to accept the view that Congress intended to have courts 
police every instance where subjective judgment may be 
tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related 
to sex. 
But plaintiff takes her argument one step further and 
stresses that the Price Waterhouse partnership evaluation 
system permitted negative comments tainted by stereo-
typing to defeat her candidacy, despite clear indications 
that the evaluations were tainted by discriminatory stereo-
typing. All the evaluators were men. The Policy Board 
gave great weight to the negative views of individuals 
who had very little contact with the plaintiff. Several of 
the negative comments allude to the plaintiff's sex and 
many might be attributed to sex stereotyping. Despite 
the fact that the comments on women candidates often 
suggested that the male evaluators may have been in-
fluenced by a sex bias, the Policy Board never addressed 
the problem. The firm never took any steps in its partner-
ship policy statement or in the evaluation forms sub-
mitted to partners to articulate a policy against discrimi-
nation or to discourage sexual bias?3 The Admissions 
Committee never attempted to investigate whether any of 
13 Price Waterhouse, submitted evidence to show it had promul-
gated a general policy of equal employment opportunities in employ-
ment for all minorities . Def.Ex. Nos. 88, 89. However, the ex-
hibits before the Court only reflect a policy statement issued some-
time in 1983. More importantly, the statement is directed gen-
erally a.t staff employment. It is not clear whether it applies to the 
partnership selection process at all and it does not address any 
special concerns with discrimination against women in an over-
whelmingly male partnership. 
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the negative comments concerning the plaintiff were based 
on a discriminatory doubt standard.14 
Whenever a promotion system relies on highly sub-
jective evaluations of candidates by individuals or panels 
dominated ·by members of a different sex, there is ground 
for concern rthat such "high level subjectivity subjects the 
ultimate promotion decision to the intolerable occurrence 
of conscious or unconscious prejudice." Robinson v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir.1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 65, 54 L.Ed.2d 78 (1977). 
Such procedures "must be closely scrutinized because of 
their capacity for masking unlawful bias." Davis v. Cali-
fano, 613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C.Cir.1979). This scrutiny 
comprehends examination of evaluation procedures that 
permit or give effect ito sexual stereotyping. Differential 
treatment on account of sex, even if it is not obviously 
based on a characteristic of sex, violates Title VII. Mc-
Kinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C.Cir.1985). 
An employer who treats a woman with an assertive per-
sonality in a different manner than if she had been a man 
is guilty of sex discrimination. See Craik v. Minnesota 
State University Board, 731 F.2d 465, 481-84 (8th Cir. 
1984) ; Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F.Supp. 1231, 1235 
(D.D.C.1976) . A female cannot be excluded from a part-
nership dominated by males if a sexual bias plays a part 
in the decision and the employer is aware that such bias 
played a part in the exclusion decision. 
• Although the stereotyping by individual partners may 
have been unconscious on their part, the maintenance of 
a system that gav,e weight ito such biased criticisms, was 
a conscious act of the partnership as a whole. There is 
no direct evidence of any determined purpose to mali-
ciously discriminate against women but plaintiff appears 
to have been a victim of "omissive and subtle" discrim-
ination created by a system thait made evaluations based 




on "outmoded attiitudes" determinative. Marimont v. 
Califano, 464 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 & n. 15 (D.D.C. 1979). 
As noted above, the firm accorded substantial weight to 
negative comments and ,recommendations, even if · they 
came from partners who had limited ,contact with a can-
didate. The evidence indicates ,that Price Waterhouse 
should have been aware that women being evaluated by 
male partners might well be victims of discriminatory 
stereot1,pes. Yet the firm made no efforts to maJ.rn part- · 
ners sensitive to the dangers, .to discourage comments 
tainted by sexism, or to investigate comments to deter-
mine whether they were influenced by ste,reotypes . .. 
The Court is aware that this case involves applying• 
Title VII to a professional partnership. Partnership con-
sideration was clearly a privilege of plaintiff's employ-
ment covered by Tltle VII. Hishon v. King and Spauld-
ing, 467 U.S. 69,. 104 S.Ot. -2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). 
Title VII does not bar a partnership from considering 
subjective evaluations of interpersonal skills as significant 
criteria in the partnership selection process. Subjective 
evaluations in high-level, pr,ofessioilal jobs have received 
particular deference in Title VII cases. See Zahorik v. 
Cornell University, 729 F.3tl 85, 93 (2d Cir.1984); Har-
ris v. Group Health Insurance, 662 F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. 
Cir.1981); Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in 
High Places, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 945, 973-78 (1982); Wain-
troob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment OppcfiJ-
tunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 Wm. 
• 
& Mary L.Rev. 45, 48-62 ( 1979). However, while pa-rtner-
ships must be given freedom to evaluate the qualificatiens 
of employees who seek .to.,..b~ome partners-, they are not ,. 
free to injeot stereotyped assumptions about women into 
the selection process. Neither a partnership nor any,..other 
employer can remain indifferent to indications that its 
~valuation system is subjl ct to sex bias, as Price Water-
house did in plaintiff's case. Price Waterhouse's failure 







sibiHty that their judgments may be biased, to diS<!ourage 
stereotyping, and to investigate and discard, where ap-
propriate, comments that suggest a double standard con-
stitutes a violation of Title VII in ithis instance.15 
Price Waterhouse had every reason and legal right to 
come down hard on abrasive conduct in men or women 
seeking partnership. But " '[i] n forbidding employers to 
diS<!riminate ,against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.' " County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161, 180, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 2253, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 
(1981), quoting Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 
1375 n. 13, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). This is not a case 
where "standards were shaped only by neutral profes .. 
sional and technical considerations and not by any stereo-
typical notions of female roles and images." Craft v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 38fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 
(BNA) 404, 412 (8th Cir.1985). Discriminatory stereo-
typing of females was permitted to play a part. Comments 
influenced by sex stereotypes were made by partners; the 
firm's evaluation process gave substantial weight to these 
comments.; and the partnership failed to address the con-
spicuous problem of stereotyping in partnership evalua-
tions. While these three factors might have been innocent 
alone, they combined to produce discrimination in the case 
of this plaintiff. The Court .finds that the Policy Board's 
decision not rto admit the plaintiff rto partnership was 
tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were the direct 
15 Common sense is confirmed by the literature, on the problem 
of sex stereotyping which suggests that making evaluators aware 
of the risk of biased evaluations and inquiring as to whether gen-
eralizations are supported by concrete incidents can be effective 
in eliminating or minimizing stereotyping. See Taub, supra note 
7, at 3600, 395-97; Wiley and Eskilson, supra note 8, at 9. 
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result of its failure to address the evident problem of 
sexual stereotyping in partners' evaluations.16 
Remedy 
Because plaintiff had considerable problems dealing with 
staff and peers, the Court cannot say that she would have 
been elected to partnership if the Policy Board's decision 
had not been tainted by sexually biased evaluations. Even 
supporters of the plaintiff viewed her style as somewhat 
offensive and detrimental to her effectiveness as a man-
ager. However, once a plaintiff proves •that sex discrim-
ination played a role in an employment decision, the plain-
tiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence that the decision 
would have been the same absent discrimination. Williams 
v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C.Cir.1980); Day v. 
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (D.C.Cir.1976). Price 
Waterhouse has not done so. Where sex discrimination 
is present, even if a promotion decision is a mixture of 
legitimate and discriminatory considerations, uncertain-
ties must be resolved against the employer so that the 
16 There is currently a split among the circuits as to• whether a 
subjective evaluation process may be challenged based on disparate 
impact and disparate treatment theories or may only be, challenged 
on disparate treatment theory. Compare Pouncy v. Prudential 
Insurance Company of America, 668 F.2d 795, 799-801 (5th Cir. 
1982) (discriminatory impact model inappropriate• for challenging 
subjective evaluation procedures) with Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 
1516, 1522-25 (11th Cir. 1985) (both models may be used to chal-
lenge subjective evaluations) ; Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1288 
n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disparate impact applied to, evaluation 
process with some subjective elements). We need not become in-
volved in this dispute. Plaintiff cannot show the substantial 
statistical disparity ordinarily required to show that a subjective 
evaluation process produces a discriminatory disparate· impact. 
See Yartzoff v. State of Oregon, 745 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1984). This 
decision is based on disparate treatment where, the employer main-
tained a subjective evaluation process which, based on the proof 
presented in the comments on the plaintiff, resulted in plaintiff's 
evaluation being tainted by a discriminatory bias. 
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remedial purposes of Title VII will not be thwarted by 
saddling an individual •subject to discrimination with an 
impossible burden of proof. 
However, plaintiff must carry the burden of proof on 
another issue. She has the burden of proving that she 
was constructively discharged. If the plaintiff resigned 
voluntarily, and not because Price Waterhouse made 
working conditions intolerable and drove her to quit, she 
is not entitled to 1an order that she made a partner. Clark 
v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (D.C.Cir.1981). The 
fact that discrimination has occurred does not, by itself, 
provide the "aggravating factors" required to prove a 
constructive discharge. Id. at 173-74. Plaintiff has not 
shown any history of discrimination, humiliation or other 
aggravating factors that would have compelled her to 
resign. She dropped her allegations of harassment and 
retaliation before .trial. Aside from Price Waterhouse's. 
denial of partnership, plaintiff's experience at -the firm 
appears to have been quite normal and amicable. The one 
incident in which a project managed by rthe plaintiff was 
unfavorably evaluated appears to have involved a dis-
agreement over the appropriate technical standards rather 
than an improper effort to pressure plaintiff to -resign. 
Price Waterhouse offered to retain her as an employee 
and some partners even encouraged her to itake this option 
rather than resign when it appeared unlikely that she 
would become a partner.17 Being denied partnership was 
undoubtedly a professional disappointment and it may 
have been professionally advantageous for plaintiff to 
leave the firm when it was unlikely she would not ob-
tain her ultimate goal. Disappointments do not constitute 
a constructive discharge, however. See Bourque v. Powell 
Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th 
Cir.1980); Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Systems Agency, 
Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1107, 1117-18 (M.D.N.C.1984). Recog-
nizing that in partnerships, as in other employment con-






be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimina-
tion is attacked within the context of exiting employment 
relationships." 617 F.2d at 66, plaintiff's failure to show 
a constructive discharge requires the Court to deny plain-
tiff's request for an order directing Price Waterhouse to 
make her a partner. 
Because plaintiff has failed to prove a constructive 
discharge, she is not entitled to any monetary relief for 
the period subsequent rto her resignation. Clarlo. v. Marsh, 
665 F.2d a;t 1172. Nevertheless, plaintiff has sartisfied 
her burden of proving discrimination under Title VII and 
established the predicate for an award of backpay from 
the date she would have been elected partner, July 1, 
1983, until her voluntary resignation on January 17, 
1984. Backpay for these few months, limited to the dif-
ference between plaintiff's compensation as a senior man-
ager during that period and what her compensation would 
have been if elected ,to partnership, might have been ap-
propriate if proof had been presented. However, no evi-
dence has been presented on what compensation plaintiff 
would have received if she had been elected partner. The 
parties have represented that, without the knowledge or 
consent of the Court, they agreed to defer resolving the 
amount of backpay until the issue of liability was re-
solved. But the parties do not have the authority to struc-
ture a trial for their own convenience. Issues can only 
be separated for a separate trial by order of the Court. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42 (b). No such order was ever requested or 
granted in this case. A party who makes an "unauthor-
ized determination not to go forward on issues that were 
properly in the case does ,so at his own peril." U.S. 
Industries Inc. v. Blake Construction Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 
195, 209-10 (D.C.Cir.1985). Under the circumstances 
the Court can do no more than recognize plaintiff as the 
prevailing party on the issue of liability, grant judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff, and award attorneys fees. No 
other equitable relief is appropriate on this record. 
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An appropriaite order is entered contemporaneous with 
the filing of this memorandum. 
ORDER 
It appearing for ,reasons set forth in a memorandum 
filed this day that plainrtiff has prevailed on the merits of 
her claim that denial of partnership in her specific situa-
tion was caused, in pa.l'lt, by defendant's failure to protecrt 
against the presence of sex discrimination in evaluations 
of her qualifications for partnership, but that plaintiff 
has failed to establish any basis for granting equitable 
relief in the form of hackpay or orther relief, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the complaint shall be and hereby is 
dismissed; and it is further 
ORDERED, that plaintiff ,shall be and hereby is 
awarded her reasonable attorneys fees plus costs to be 
set by the clerk; and it is fui:,ther 
ORDERED, that the parties shall attempt to agree on 
an amount to compensate for such reasonable attorney 
fees and advise the Court in wrirting on or before Sep-
tember 30, 1985, whether further proceedings to estab-
lish the fee award will be necessary. 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6052 




ANN B. HOPKINS 
v. 
·PRICE WATERHOUSE, 
[Filed Aug. 4, 1987] 
Appellant 
Appellant 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
Before: EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and 
JOYCE HENS GREEN,* District Judge. 
* Of the United States District Court for the, District of Co-
lumbia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (a). 
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JUDGMENT 
These causes came on to be heard on the records on 
appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, and were argued by counsel. On 
consideration thereof, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, by this Court, that the 
judgment of the District Court appealed from in these 
causes is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
and these cases are remanded, in accordance with the 
Opinion for the Court filed herein this date. 
Date: August 4, 1987 
Per Curiam 
For The Court 
/s/ George A. Fisher 
GEORGE A. FISHER 
Clerk 
Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge Green. 
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams. 
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APPENDIXD 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6052 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
v. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
[,Filed Sept. 30, 1987] 
Before: EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges; 
JOYCE H. GREEN,* District Judge, U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing of 
appellee/ cross-appellant, it is 
ORDERED, by the Court, that the petition is denied. 
Per Curia.m 
FOR THE COURT: 
GEORGE A. FISHER 
Clerk 
By: / s/ Robert A. Bonner 
ROBERT A. BONNER 
Deputy Clerk 
Circuit Judge Williams would grant the petition for re-
hearing. 
* Sitting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 292 (a). 
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APPENDIX E 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6052 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
v. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
[Filed Sept. 30, 1987) 
Before: WALD, Chief Judge; ROBINSON, MIKVA, ED-
WARDS, RUTH B. GINSBURG, BORK, STARR, 
SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS and D. H. 
GINSBURG, Circuit Judges 
ORDER 
The suggestion for rehearing en bane of appellee/ 
cross-appellant has been circulated to the full Court. The 
taking of a vote thereon was requested. Thereafter, a 
majority of the judges of the Court in regular active 
service did not vote in favor of the suggestion. Upon 
consideration of the foregoing, it is 
ORDERED, by the Court en bane, that the suggestion 
is denied. 
Per Curiam 
FOR THE COURT: 
GEORGE A. FISHER 
Clerk 
By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner 
ROBERT A. BONNER 
Deputy Clerk 
Chief Judge Wald and Circuit Judges Starr and D. H. 
Ginsburg did not participate in this order. 
